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A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at
Common Law: Justifiable Reliance and Moral
Obligation
Kevin M. Teeven'
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past two centuries, formalist judges and commentators
have tried in vain to suffocate the reliance and moral obligation
alternatives to a monist bargain test of promissory liability. While
treatise writers possess an understandable penchant to reduce to
first principles the complexity and variability in scattered case
law, case law reports since the birth of modern contract law in the
sixteenth century document judicial recognition of three good reasons that common law courts have found to bind promisors. Two of
those reasons are grounded upon reliance and moral obligation -which are the focus of this study -- and lack the element of reciprocity. Promises that induce justifiable reliance and restitutionary promises on moral obligation promises are the only categories
of unbargained-for promises binding at common law. The characterization of these promises as gratuitous does not mean a gift was
intended; rather, it indicates that nothing was demanded in exchange for the promise. Judicial enforcement of these gratuitous
promises constitutes an acknowledgement that a strict application
of the bargain test to all promises does not fairly circumscribe all
of the good reasons for enforcement of promises that arise in human consensual transactions.
The enforcement of gratuitous promises on reliance and moral
obligation facts share a moral philosophy that promises which induce reasonable reliance or which acknowledge past moral obligations ought to be binding when necessary to prevent injustice.
While at an abstract level justifiable reliance and moral obligation
share the basic natural law notion that a promise should be binding if necessary to avert injustice, the concrete implementation of
that impulse for reasons of reliance and moral obligation does not
embrace all of the reasons recognized in Continental natural and
1.

J.D., University of Illinois (1971); Caterpillar Professor, Bradley University.
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civil law for enforcement of gratuitous promises. The more limited
common law solution has been to corral practices in equity into
more structured principles for cases of induced reliance and moral
obligation.
Both categories of remediable gratuitous promises are consensual and, though lacking in demands for reciprocity, do not contain donative intent. Both of them include a promise by only one
of the parties and no provision for reciprocal exchange of promises
or value. Often the circumstances surrounding these promises
make the opportunity to strike a bargained-for exchange impossible. Since the bargain construct does not take into account special
circumstances outside the context of a reciprocal market agreement, liability for reliance and moral obligation is grounded upon
a coalescence of the consensual theory and equitable notions of
fairness. Relief under the doctrines of justifiable reliance and
moral obligation, today known respectively as promissory estoppel
and the moral obligation principle, are consistent with community
standards that promisors should be bound when expectations are
raised by promises that induce reasonable reliance or that commit
to restitution. Without these hardship theories, promises worthy
of enforcement would fall through the cracks between the fields of
bargain, tort, and restitution.
The doctrines of justifiable reliance and moral obligation of
course apply in quite different circumstances. While the promise
relied upon in justifiable reliance commits to future performance,
a moral obligation promise commits to make restitution for a past
receipt of a benefit. The two gratuitous promise doctrines facilitate relief from the strict demands of the bargain principle, one on
the periphery of the detriment side and the other on the benefit
side of consideration's split personality. Justifiable reliance facilitates relief beyond the outer perimeter of what detriment consideration can cover, and moral obligation provides restitutionary
relief beyond the bounds of benefit consideration. The two doctrines can sometimes augment each other, as in the case of an inadequate moral obligation promise, in which relief may be given if
the promise is relied upon. Likewise, where there are insufficient
facts for justifiable reliance to apply, a subsequent moral obligation promise to atone for the induced reliance may save the day.
The legal history of both justifiable reliance and moral obligation has involved periodic attempts to extend earlier reliance and
moral obligation precedents. Subsequent to Mansfield's tenure on
the King's Bench, about every half century or so a staunch conser-
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vative drive has been mounted against nearly all previous precedents binding gratuitous promisors. As a consequence, there have
been ebbs and flows in how readily courts have granted reliance
and moral obligation relief. Nevertheless the alternatives to bargain of justifiable reliance and moral obligation have steadfastly
survived over the centuries to ameliorate the harshness that can
come from the narrow requirement of reciprocity. To this day, the
three alternative bases for enforcement of promises coexist uneasily, but necessarily, in common law contract.
What follows is a legal history of judicial enforcement of the
only categories of binding gratuitous promises, justifiable reliance
and moral obligation, from their sixteenth century roots to the
publication of the modern restatements of contract law. The focus
on the reliance remedy will be on case precedent leading up to the
final draft of Section 90 of the first Restatement of the Law of Contracts; and for moral obligation, the study of case precedent will
likewise focus on the precedents in support of the moral obligation
theory that were in place before the first Restatement, though that
principle was not enunciated by the drafters of the Restatement
until the Restatement Second appeared a half century later.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
The origins of promissory reliance hardship relief can be found
in decisions at law and in equity since at least the Elizabethan
period. At law, early assumpsit actions were effectively modern
promissory estoppel actions for which actionability was found
when tortious detrimental reliance facts were present to distinguish a case from the insufficient nonfeasance of merely not doing
what was promised.2 However, before the mid-sixteenth century,
2.

See Doige's Case, Y.B. 20 Hen. VI, f.34, pl. 4 (1442) reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT,

HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 347 (1949) (Ayscough, J.

emphasized that trespassory action was unavailable for breach of promise to build a house,
but that it could be brought if the house was built badly); John Style's Case, B.M. MS.,
Hargrave 388, f. 215b (ca. 1527) reprinted in A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 630, 631 (1975) (ruling that

nonfeasance is nudum pactum but reliance on a person who failed to deliver payment entrusted to him is an actionable tort in assumpsit). See also S.F.C. MILSON, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATION OF THE COMMON LAW 357 (2D ED. 1981); JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION

To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 384-86 (3d ed. 1990) (observing that assumpsit as reliance
remedy was a principle of moral philosophy akin to promissory estoppel); SAMUEL J.
STOLJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW 37-38 (1975). The tortious notion that
reliance induced by a promise was remediable may have been borrowed from the church
court action fideo laesio by both common law and chancery courts. See R.H. Helmholz,
Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 L. Q. REv. 406, 426-31 (1975) (explaining that fidei laesio
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assumpsit and its attendant consideration test, originally conceived as a reliance action, had been converted into a reciprocal
contract action in the process of the King's Bench Court's action of
assumpsit usurping the former dominant contract role of the
Court of Common Pleas' action of debt.3 As a result, justifiable
reliance was transmuted into bargained-for detriment consideration; thereafter, reliance relief would continue in equity, but reliance notions would simmer beneath the surface at-law until they
were reinvigorated later in cases of injustice in gratuitous and
commercial promises. In the eighteenth century, assumpsit's reliance ground was resuscitated in decisions of common law courts
under the leadership of King's Bench Chief Justices Holt and
Mansfield. Holt resurrected assumpsit's tort origins in Coggs v.
Bernard by ruling a gratuitous bailee liable because the bailor relied on the bailee's promise to carefully transport goods.4
Later in the eighteenth century, Justice Wilmot, a member of
Mansfield's court, suggested an extension of Holt's reliance notion
to a commercial undertaking in Pillans v. Van Mierop.' Although
Wilmot justified reliance relief on the ground of natural law,6 a
reporter's case note claimed Coggs was authority for the reliance
relief in Pillans,7 and Langdell the author of Summary of the Law
applied when promise reposed trust in the promisor by reliance and was later deceived by
breach of faith). See also Willard T. Barbour, A History of Contract in Early English Equity
in TV OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 163-67 (1914) [hereinafter Barbour,
Contract in Equity] (concluding that chancery borrowed from ecclesiastical fidei laesio).
3. See ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR AND STUDENT (2d Dial. 1530) in 91 SELDEN SOCIETY 228
(J.L. Barton ed. 1974) [hereinafter DOCTOR AND STUDENT] (Student of common law declared,: "A[a]nd a nude contracte is where a man maketh a bargayne or sale of his goodes
or landes without any compensation appointed for yt."); John H. Baker, Originsof the Doctrine of Consideration,1535-1585 in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 339-41 (M. Arnold ed. 1981) (noting in pleadings an increasing emphasis on the need for reciprocity by around 1540); MILSOM, supra note 2, at
358; David J. Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early Sixteenth Century: The Origins of
the Indebitatus Counts, 41 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 142, 153 (1982); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY
OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 40-41, 43-46 (1990) [hereinafter
TEEVEN, HISTORY OF CONTRACT] (tracing competition between two common law courts for
contract jurisdiction).
4. 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 113 (1703) (ruling "that the owner's entrusting him with the
goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him").
5. 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1039-40 (1765) (Wilmot noted that the plaintiffs had suspended
their right to call on their debtor's performance in reliance upon the defendant financier's
assurance that the debtor's draft would be honored). In 1927, Kellogg, J.'s dissent emphasized that proposed Restatement promissory estoppel Section 90 was not novel, since it had
been a sufficient ground in Pillansv. Van Mierop. Allegheny College v. Chatauqua County
Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173, 177-78 (N.Y.1927).
6. Pillans,97 Eng. Rep. at 1040 (invoking law of "nature" and of "nations" as bases for
binding promise).
7. Id. at 1040.
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of Contracts, later acknowledged the reliance logic in Pillans.'
Wilmot's opinion was also notable for his observation that promises at common law had been held binding under the three alternative tests of bargain, moral obligation and reliance.9 Dictum in
a later English House of Lords decision denied the validity of Pillans because of Mansfield's heretical remarks regarding the doctrine of consideration unrelated to Justice Wilmot's reliance comments. 10 Influential nineteenth century treatise writers Kent,"
Holmes 2 and Langdell 3 denied the validity, as precedent, of the
justifiable reliance relief granted in Coggs and Pillans. Indeed,
Kent derided recovery on both reliance and moral obligation when
he declared in 1809 that justifiable reliance was a mere unenforceable moral obligation. 4 For market formalists, common law
contract actionability was grounded exclusively on the need for a
bargain regardless of the strain of reliance hardship precedents in
the case books. The resistance to precedent not fitting one's theory contravenes the very nature of the common law as a precedent-driven construct, in contrast to the influence that academic
theories have on a civilian jurisdiction." Notwithstanding such
opposition, nineteenth century republican support for natural law
precepts made American courts receptive to the ameliorating ef8.

CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 79 (2d ed.

1880) [hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY] (disagreeing with the dictum that reliance could

be a ground for a binding promise).
9. Pillans,97 Eng. Rep. at 1039-40.
10. Rann v. Hughes, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n.a. (1778). Rann did not address the reliance
dictum of Justice Wilmot in Pillans v. Van Mierop, but instead rejected Mansfield's claims
that consideration was not needed to support commercial contracts and that a writing could
replace the need for consideration.
11. See Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84, 99 (N.Y. 1809) (claiming that Coggs v. Bernard
required the misfeasance of negligence for a bailee's liability thus a gratuitous agent's
breach of a promise to obtain insurance, which was relied upon by the property owner, was
not actionable since mere nonfeasance had occurred); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 772 (9t ed. 1858).
12.

See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 292, 294-96 (1881). Holmes disin-

genuously employed Holt's bailment decision Coggs v. Bernard .to make the general claim
that the use of reliance as a viable theory was doctrinally flawed despite bailment not fitting contracts traditionally governed by the doctrine of consideration. See Coggs, 92 Eng.
Rep. at 113.
13. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at § 79 (2d ed. 1880) (rejecting reliance
logic in Pillans v. Van Mierop as bad law since it did not conform to the bargain model).
14. Thorne, 4 Johns. at 97.
15. In corresponding with Holmes, English writer Frederick Pollock criticized Langdell,
and obliquely Holmes, for theoretical claims regarding the common law contract that were
out of step with actual precedent See 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 80 (Mark D. Howe ed.
1942) (Pollock wrote to Holmes,: "But this is surely not now arguable except in the Langdellian ether of a super-terrestrial Common Law where authority does not count at all.").
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fect of reliance relief on unbargained-for commercial and noncommercial promises.
Early practices in the court of equity contributed to the growth
in justifiable reliance recovery as well. Chancery found a good
6 to enforce a promise relied upon since at least
reason, or causa,"
the fifteenth century in order to protect a promisee's raised expectations to the extent of actual reliance. 7 Chancellors concluded
that it would be equitable fraud to permit promissors to insist on
strict application of contract doctrine after having induced injurious reliance. The most influential chancery practice, to which
American courts drew analogies, was protection of the reliance
interest in the part performance exception to the Statute of
Frauds writing requirement for contracts to transfer interests in
land. 8 Equity deemed it an equitable fraud to raise the defense of
lack of a writing after an oral promise had induced a promisee's
reliance of taking possession of the land and part payment. 9 The
equitable part performance exception would engender nineteenth
century common law extensions to cases of reliance on commercial
contract modifications" and at-will business licenses and distributorships.2 Justifiable reliance emerged in the nineteenth century
along the two separate strands of promises made as subscriptions
(mainly to charities) and as familial gifts, and, promises made in a
market context. A body of precedent built up within each strand,
but precedents were not transferred from one strand to the other.

16. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 279, 389; MILSOM, supra note 2, at 357.
17. See Barbour, Contract in Equity, supra note 2, at 166-67 (giving examples of gratuitous bailments and marriage contracts); JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY14244 (1913) (stating that equity gave reliance relief before 1500 to plaintiffs who incurred
detriment on the faith of promise).
18. See An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Car. II, c. 3, s. 4 (1677).
19. See Butcher v. Stapley, 23 Eng. Rep. 524, 525 (1686); Brown v. Hoag, 29 N.W. 135,
137 (Minn. 1886) (emphasizing the fraud of raising statute after reliance of part performance); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Boyd, 7 N.E. 487, 489 (Ill. 1886). See also 5 JOHN N.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 2239 (4t, ed. 1918) (characterizing it as
a "virtual fraud").
20. See, e.g., Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 S.&R. 241, 244 (Pa. 1818) (modification of land
license); Munroe v. Perkins, 26 Mass. 298, 303, 305 (1830) (modification of construction
contract).
21. Rerick v. Kern, 14 S.&R. 267, 271 (Pa. 1826) (land license); Harris v. Brown, 51 A.
586, 587 (Pa. 1902) (business license); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F.2d 138, 139 (E.D.Pa.
1925) (business distributorship).
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CharitableSubscriptionsand FamilialGift Promises

A.

Restatement of Contracts Reporter Williston declared in the
early 1920s that instances of actionable justifiable reliance had
generally been in cases of charitable subscription.22 In fact, commercial justifiable reliance relief also was granted with some regularity by at least the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. The
only market-related gratuitous promises directly influenced by
charitable subscriptions were business and community subscriptions;2 precedents for charitable subscriptions, business subscriptions, and other gift promises were cited interchangeably as authority within a sui generis field.24 Victorian charitable, community, and business subscriptions facilitated the development of
necessary infrastructure, in the absence of available state funding,
for growing, energetic communities.
The analysis which follows will focus on the case law developments of justifiable reliance on charitable subscriptions prior to
Williston placing the spotlight on this category of justifiable reliance in his commentary on the first Restatement. Common law
courts' grant of reliance relief on charitable promises was recognized at common law since the early sixteenth century. This form
of judicial relief was discussed in St. German's 1530 dialogue Doc5 which was cast as a comparative law dialogue
tor and Student,"
between a student of the common law and a doctor of divinity. The
22.

See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1921) [hereinafter

WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE] (claiming that actionable justifiable reliance had "generally

been cases of charitable subscriptions"). Accord AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE COMMENTARIES
ON CONTRACTS, Restatement No. 2, 16 (1926) [hereinafter ALI COMMENTARIES 1926]. See
also FREDERICK POLLOCK, WALD'S POLLCOK ON CONTRACTS 186 n.3 (Samuel Williston ed.,
3"' ed. 1906) [hereinafter WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK] (giving only charitable and business subscriptions as examples of binding justifiable reliance).
23. See, e.g., Bryant v. Goodnow, 22 Mass. 228, 230 (1827) (giving both charitable and
business subscription reliance cases as authority for business subscription relied upon);
Brown v. Marion Commercial Club, 97 N.E. 958, 961 (Ind. 1912) (stating that the issue of
enforceability of subscription to encourage industries to move to community was "governed
by rules for charitable subscriptions"). Cf. Curry v. Kentucky Western Ry. Co., 78 S.W. 435,
436 (Ky. 1904) (holding binding landowners' promises to induce building of railroad without
reference to charitable subscription decisions).
24. Examples of charitable subscription decisions citing business subscription precedents include: Robertson v. March, 4 Ill. 198, 199 (1841); Pryor v. Cain, 25 ll. 263, 265, 294
(1861). For an example of a business subscription decision citing a charitable subscription
precedent, see Bryant v. Goodnow, 22 Mass. 228, 230 (1827). And for an example of a familial gift decision citing a charitable subscription precedent, see Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.
W. 365, 366 (Minn. 1898).
25. DOCTOR AND STUDENT in 91 SELDON SOCIETY. The first Dialogue was published in
Latin in 1523; the second Dialogue, published in English in 1530 as the English Reformation heated up, is decidedly more anti-clerical.
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doctor enunciated the practices followed in conscience by church
courts and clerical chancellors. He observed that a promise to
make a bequest to a university, a church, or clergy was a binding
pious causa in conscience, without any reference to the need for
reliance; whereas, the student remarked that such a promise was
not actionable at common law unless reliance was induced.2 6 The
student gave the example of a promise to pay a surgeon, if he
would heal a poor man, and emphasized that the promise was not
binding at common law because the obligation was merely "spiritual" but that it would become actionable if the promise induced
the surgeon to perform the act.27 This early use of assumpsit as a
tort remedy for reliance hardship on charitable promises would be
revived in American contracts and charitable subscription decisions of the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth century American courts, many of them recently
fused,2 8 borrowed from practices in equity and thereby returned to
the earliest use of assumpsit to relieve harm induced by charitable
and commercial promises. Some courts rationalized the solution
by manipulating consideration doctrine in order to smuggle in reliance relief under a disingenuous claim that reliance had been
requested or bargained for. Other courts understood the consideration test to cover more than merely bargains and took the position that the presence of consideration simply meant that a good
reason existed to bind a promisor and that justifiable reliance was
26. Id. at 230 (second Dialogue). In this Reformation-era dialogue, the student spoke
critically of the canon law practice of ruling binding "entente inwarde in the herte," which
moral obligation the student of the common law thought ought not be binding in the absence of reliance since intent was "secrete in hys owne conscience," but the promise was
binding if relied upon, "thoughe he that made the promise have no worldely profyte by yt."
Id.
27. Id. at 230-31 ("And more ouer though the thynge that he shall doo be all spyrytuall:
Yet yf he perfourme yt I thynke an accyon lyeth at the common lawe.") The reliance offered
proof of intent, which was lacking in the mere allegation of a spiritual promise. See
SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 390-92 (commenting that the spiritual motive to fulfill charitable
promise was converted into a secular common law theory in this Reformation era dialogue).
See also Kevin M. Teeven, Proving Fifteenth Century Promises, 24 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 121,
132-38 (1986) (highlighting other decisions involving factual circumstances which supplied
proof lacking in pure nonfeasance). In equity and ecclesiastical courts, the promisor was
bound in conscience because the charitable promise was made, but at early common law the
focus was on the tortious reliance harm to the promisee.
28. Fusion of law and equity existed in some states from the early years of the republic.
See ANTHONY LAUSSAT, AN ESSAY ON EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 153-57 (1826) (pointing out
that at least ten states had fused courts in 1820s). By the middle of the nineteenth century, fusion was widespread in the U.S. and England. See Charles Hepburn, The Historical
Development of Code Pleading in America and England, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 643, 655-680 (1908).
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a good reason.29 Still other courts couched their rationales upon
the bases of the equitable theories," independent of consideration,
of pure reliance, and of equitable estoppel. Further afield, enforcement of policy-laden charitable subscriptions was justified31
upon equitable causa, irrespective of whether there was reliance.
Powerful policy reasons existed in Victorian days for enforcement
of charitable and community subscriptions since the infrastructures of growing communities were financed, in the absence of
available government funding, through subscriptions for hospitals,
schools, courthouses, wharves, etc. In regard to the equitable reliance ground, Williston was correct that gratuitous gift decisions in
the United States were forthright in recognizing an independent
reliance theory;32 however, commercial reliance relief was usually
justified through an expanded definition of the doctrine of consideration.
Perhaps the young republic's earliest common law decision binding a charitable subscriber on reliance grounds was rendered by
Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Parker in his 1817
opinion in Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy v. Allen.33 The defendant's subscription for construction of an educational building was
held "sufficient" under an expanded definition of consideration in
that the trustees had incurred expense "on the faith of the defendant's subscription."3 4 Parker stated he was following the principle in the Massachusetts business subscription decision Homes v.
Dana of two years before wherein the defendant was bound because plaintiff relied upon defendant's subscription.35 Parker con29. Chief Justice Holt had introduced this notion in the bailment decision Coggs v.
Bernard that reliance was a good reason in addition to bargain for finding consideration,
but it had been rejected, beyond bailment facts, because of the prevailing absolutist bargain
view. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845); HOLMES, supra note 12, at 292, 29496; LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at § 79.
30. See 3 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 359 (5' ed. 1866) (observing
that reliance was binding in equity in much the same way that consideration operated at
law).
31. See George v. Harris, 4 N.H. 533, 535-36 (1829); Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401, 403 (1870) (dictum); 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 453 (1866). See also RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 90 (2) (1981)
(providing that a charitable subscription is binding without proof of reliance).
32. 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22, at § 139 (claiming that justifiable
reliance relief found in case law had "generally been cases of charitable subscriptions").
33. 14 Mass. 172 (1817) (special assumpsit). Isaac Parker (1768-1830) was chief justice
from 1814 to 1830 and adjunct professor of law at Harvard 1816-27.
34. Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, 14 Mass. at 176. The court appeared to say it
was sufficient in response to defendant's argument that sufficient consideration was absent. Id. at 173.
35. Id. at 176; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190, 192 (1815).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

verted the equitable explanation in Homes v. Dana that defendant
was "bound in equity and good conscience"36 into the basis at-law
of sufficient consideration.37 This justification, standing alone,
was the common law solution stated by the student in Doctor and
Student that justifiable reliance was a good reason under the
promissory actionability test that would become known as the doctrine of consideration later in the sixteenth century.38 In the absence of reliance, the subscription would have been the doctor's
Chief Justice
moral obligation, binding only in conscience."
Parker bolstered his reliance reasoning for finding sufficient consideration by adding a more conventional doctrinal explanation,
though without explication, that the plaintiffs expended money on
the defendant's "implied request."' This latter point was a disingenuous attempt to rationalize that the defendant had bargained
for the trustees' reliance."
A decade later in Bryant v. Goodnow, a Massacusetts court held
a business subscription binding because of reliance on a common
project that was beneficial to the subscribers.4" The opinion cited
as authority Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy v. Allen as well as
4 3 The Bryant v. Goodnow opinion made no referHomes v. Dana.
ence to the doctrine of consideration; it conflated the equitable
conclusion in Homes v. Dana that the promisor was "bound in equity and good conscience"" with Trustees of Farmington's finding
of sufficient consideration 45 and stated that the defendant was "le-

36. Homes, 12 Mass. at 192.
37. Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, 14 Mass. at 176.
38. DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 3, at 230-31.
39. Id. Modem policy grounds given for binding charitable subscriptions are effectively
moral obligations.
40. Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, 14 Mass. at 176.
41. The opinion in the landmark English decision Hunt v. Bate provided that consideration was present only when a bargain was established by the defendant's request for the
plaintiffs act. Hunt v. Bate, 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (1568). New York courts introduced the
fiction that the defendant's request could be implied in cases of restitutionary promises.
See Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 243, 244 (1813) (adopting the doctrinal solution
suggested by Saunders in his 1798 reporter's note to an earlier case). See Osborne v.
Rogers, 85 Eng. Rep. 318, 319 n. (1680) (1798) (per Saunders). See also KEVIN M. TEEVEN,
PROMISES ONO PRIOR OBLIGATIONS AT COMMON LAW 106-09 (1998) [hereinafter TEEVEN,
PRIOR OBLIGATIONS]. In Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, the benefit-based implied request fiction was borrowed to supply a promissory reliance solution.
42. Bryant, 22 Mass. at 229.
43. Id. at 230; Homes, 12 Mass. at 192; Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, 14 Mass. at
176.
44. Homes, 12 Mass. at 192.
45. Trustees of FarmingtonAcademy, 14 Mass. at 176.
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During the succeeding decades,
gally and equitably bound."'
Massachusetts' treatment of reliance on subscriptions acted as
persuasive authority for other jurisdictions, such as Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin,4 7 and by the 1860s, the influential contracts treatise writers Parsons and Metcalf observed
that reliance-based relief was generally accepted for subscription
cases.48 Since Illinois courts did a better job than most jurisdictions in elaborating the Massachusetts' position, Illinois' case law
development of the Massachusetts rule will be highlighted as a
means of understanding the impact of the Massachusetts principle
elsewhere in the country.
The 1841 Illinois decision Robertson v. March treated the above
discussed Massachusetts cases as persuasive authority in support
of recovery for a construction contractor from a subscriber because
the contractor relied on the defendant's subscription by building
an addition to a church, which benefited all subscribers.4 9 To the
objection of lack of consideration, the court responded that the
contractor's reliance overcame the rule that a gratuitous promise
was nudum pactum. The rationale in Robertson v. March did
what the Massachusetts cases had done, and what a growing
number of nineteenth century courts would do, in effectively resuscitating Holt's expansion of the doctrine of consideration to encompass justifiable reliance, but now gratuitous promises could

46. Bryant, 22 Mass. at 230.
47. See Somers v. Miner, 9 Conn. 458, 465 (1833); Robertson v. March, 4 111. 198, 199
(1841); Mansur v. The Indianapolis & Brownsburgh Plankroad Company, 8 Ind. 440, 441
(1857); The Trustees of Foxcraft Academy v. Favor, 4 Me. 382, 383 (1826); Gittings v.
Mayhew, 6 Md. 113, 132 (1854); Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73, 89 (1863); New Lindell Hotel Co. v. Smith, 13 Mo. App. 7, 10-11 (1882); George v. Harris, 4 N.H. 533, 534-35
(1829); University of Vermont v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48, 56 (1829); Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214,
231 (1870) (quoting from Judge Metcalf's treatise and concurrence from Parsons).
48. See THERON METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 185 (1868) (citing
Massachusetts and Illinois precedents, among others, and stating that it was "the generally
adopted doctrine, though not uniform, that subscriptions were binding once relied upon"); 1
THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 453 (5' ed. 1866) (citing Massachusetts and
Illinois precedents as well and saying that reliance on subscription, before withdrawal, was
"deemed sufficient to make them obligatory"). Both Metcalf and Parsons noted in their
introductions the contributions of their students to their treatises; Metcalf commented that
his manuscript was originally developed in 1827-28 as an aid in teaching the students in
his office, and Parsons thanked his student researchers, including Langdell, for their assistance.
49. 4 Ill. 198, 199 (1841) (citing Bryant v. Goodnow as authority).
50. Robertson, 4 Ill. at 199.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

involve relationships beyond Holt's treatment of bailments. 5 By
1861, the opinion in Pryor v. Cain confidently declared it to be
"well settled" that a charitable subscription to a common, beneficial project was binding and actionable by others who relied.52 The
opinion seemed to base the decision upon the pure equitable reliance ground in the 1815 Massachusetts case Homes v. Dana,
which it cited among other authority;5 3 it made no reference to the
doctrine of consideration and stated that the defendant subscriber
was "bound in good faith" because of the reliance.54 Subsequently,
Illinois decisions that enforced charitable subscriptions on reliance
facts vacillated between the explanation that justifiable reliance
was binding in equity55 and that justifiable reliance constituted
sufficient consideration.5 6 In the twentieth century, both contracts
restatements would ground actionability for justifiable reliance
upon the pure reliance ground that a contract was binding without
consideration. For charitable subscriptions, the Restatement Second departed from the first Restatement in supplanting the requirement of actual reliance with the policy justification that
charitable subscriptions were binding "without proof that the
promise induced action or forbearance.""
An alternative equitable theory to the pure reliance ground involved the manipulation of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais.
The fitful adaptation of this equitable reliance technique to gratuitous promises was doctrinally unsound, but it gave comfort to
courts uneasy about granting relief purely because of reliance in
the absence of traditional doctrinal support. Whereas chancery
had employed equitable estoppel as an evidentiary and pleading
device to bar denial of a misrepresented fact relied upon,58 it was
51. Coggs, 92 Eng. Rep. at 113; contra HOLMES, supra note 12, at 292, 294-96;
LANGDELL SUMMARY, supra note 8, at § 79.
52. Pryor, 25 Ill. at 294 (citing the earlier Massachusetts and Illinois cases as authority).
53. Id.; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190, 192 (1815).
54. Pryor, 25 Ill. at 294.
55. See, e.g., McClure v. Wilson, 43 Ill. 356, 359-60, 362 (1867) (The plaintiff relied
upon the defendant's subscription to fill the township's Civil War military draft obligation
by paying for substitutes in the neighboring town of Olney.).
56. See, e.g., Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401, 403
379, 384 (1866). The
(1870); Thompson v. The Board of Supervisors of Mercer Co., 40 Ill.
Thompson court emphasized that the defendant's promise could be withdrawn if done before plaintiff relied. Id. at 383; Accord George v. Harris, 4 N.H. 533, 536 (1829).
57. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981).
58. See MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 345 (2d ed.
1876).
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quite another matter for courts to latch onto it to justify enforcement of promises about future performance. 59 In Beatty v. The
Western College of Toledo, the defense of lack of consideration to
support a subscriber's promissory note was met with the judicial
response that the donor was bound "in good conscience" to pay because of the college's reliance of expenses in building construction.6 ° This 1898 Illinois opinion stated that the promise would be
"upheld upon the ground of estoppel, and not by reason of any
valid consideration" on the "equitable principle" that after the
donee incurred expenses in reliance on the note the "donor should
be estopped from pleading want of consideration."' Notwithstanding the point that the function of equitable estoppel was to preclude denial of a represented fact, here it facilitated enforcement
of a promise by precluding invocation of contract doctrine.62
The employment of estoppel in pais to bind charitable subscribers was extended to cases of reliance on familial gift promises as
well. A Minnesota court held binding a promissory note to a
granddaughter so she could quit work, which she did do in reliance on the promise. 63 The court cited, without hesitation, charitable subscription decisions as precedent for the familial gift
promise. 4 The Minnesota court acknowledged that some decisions
had held that charitable subscriptions were supported by consideration, once relied upon, but said, "The true reason is the preclusion of the defendant, under the doctrine of estoppel, to deny the
consideration. 65
Promisees of familial gift promises had success in enforcement
of land gift promises by drawing analogies to the reliance factor in
59. Professor McGovney, drafter of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, criticized
the use of estoppel in pais to cover a situation for which it was not intended. Dudley 0.
McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARV. L. REV. 644, 657 (1914); cf. BIGELOW, supra note
58, at 441 (observing the peculiar practice of using a technique for representations of fact to
enforce promises).
60. Beatty v. The Western College of Toledo, Iowa, 52 N.E. 432, 436 (Ill. 1898) (Subscription was for college to construct Ladies' Boarding Hall.).
61. Beatty, 52 N.E. at 436.
62. In keeping with the court's general approach, the rationale would have been on
more solid ground if it had employed the explanation in a Connecticut decision that stated
that denial of validity of a promise, after reliance was induced, was an equitable fraud. See
Rice v. Almy, 32 Conn. 297, 304 (1864) (commercial promise).
63. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (Minn. 1898).
64. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366-67 (remarking that it is "grossly inequitable to not bind").
65. Id. at 366. See also Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 33 N.W. 74, 76 (Iowa
1887) ("This is based on the equitable principle that, after allowing the donee to incur obligations on the faith that the note would be paid, the donor should be estopped from pleading want of consideration.").
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the equitable part performance exception to the Statute of Frauds,
which barred the invocation of the statutory defense if defendant's
oral promise induced part performance. 6 During the nineteenth
century, this reliance exception to the Statute was translated into
an exception to bargain demands of the doctrine of consideration
in cases of specific performance actions to enforce familial promises to give land. In dictum in an 1866 Illinois chancery decision,
an Illinois court glided from saying that possession and improvements took it outside the Statute to the declaration that the promise rested upon a "valuable consideration" on account of the reliance." A generation later, Illinois courts accepted as gospel this
seamless equation in equity of the reliance exception to the Statute with satisfaction of the consideration test or with a pure reliance ground for promissory actionability.68 Thus, an exception to a
writing requirement miraculously was converted into a reason to
enforce a gratuitous promise. In Irwin v. Dyke, an Illinois court
cited the above 1866 chancery decision in support of specific performance of a father's verbal promise to convey land to his son because his son had relied by moving on the land and making improvements and payments.69 The court did not supply this reasoning to overcome a Statute of Frauds objection since the defendant
had failed to plead the Statute and thus was barred from the defense;" rather, the induced reliance standing alone constituted the
ground for promissory actionability.
B.

Commercial JustifiableReliance

Contrary to Williston's claim in the 1920s that actionable justifiable reliance had been generally applicable to cases of charitable
subscriptions and a few other categories of promises not traditionally governed by common law contract,7 1 justifiable reliance relief
66. See 5 POMEROY, supra note 19, at § 2239.
67. Bright v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97, 100-01 (1866) (noting that bill in chancery alleged that
father promised to deed son land and son relied by taking possession and making improvements). It was dictum because there was no evidence that improvements were made. Id.
at 101.
68. See Irwin v. Dyke, 1 N.E. 913, 915 (Ill. 1885) (declaring that case falls "within the
rule of repeated decisions of this court" that promisor is bound when reliance on promise by
possession and improvements).
69. Id. at 915-16 (explaining "that it was on the faith of the agreement" that the son
'rendered the services").
70. Id. at 914.
71. 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22, at § 139 (claiming justifiable reliance
had "generally been cases of charitable subscriptions" where courts became "dissatisfied"
with "prevailing theories" of consideration); A.L.I. COMMENTARIES 1926, supra note 22, at

Fall 2004

Binding Gratuitous Promises

on commercial promises had been regularly granted during the
nineteenth century. Indeed, a complete story of the origins of the
justifiable reliance doctrine prior to the first Restatement cannot
be told without substantial weight being given to the influence on
the doctrine of decisions binding commercial promises on account
of reliance. Williston's claim reinforced his position that the doctrine of consideration was grounded upon reciprocity of bargain,
and his marginalization of past justifiable relief cases thereby insinuated that his proposed promissory estoppel section was only
needed only for charitable and family promises that necessarily
fell outside the bargain construct.7 2 Williston's attempt to limit
the scope of promissory estoppel would retard reliance relief for
the subsequent generation. Williston would have been correct to
say that, from a doctrinal standpoint, justifiable reliance failed the
bargain test, but he was disingenuous to infer that commercial
reliance relief was not a part of precedent rendered over the preceding half century or so. Most of those precedents contained rulings that justifiable reliance qualified as consideration, but Williston attempted to excise from the doctrine of consideration the reliance alternative to bargain.
Between the early 1860's and Williston's 1926 proposal for a
promissory estoppel section in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,7 3 American courts had with some regularity, granted justifiable reliance relief on commercial promises designed to adjust to
uncertain conditions inherent in a burgeoning environment of
commerce and industry. The modern story begins by at least the
early 1860s as business planners found it increasingly necessary
to incorporate greater flexibility into their agreements in order to
contend with economic unpredictability in the context of longerterm relations. Promissory innovations in the form of open-ended
language, unilateral contract offers, at-will relations and the more
frequent need to modify contract terms butted up against traditional contract doctrine developed during earlier static times.
16 (Williston referred to his 1921 treatise). A mishmash of other categories of promises not

traditionally covered by contract law included oral land gifts, revocable land licenses, gratuitous bailment and gratuitous agency. See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
Principles From Precedents:1, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639, 654-56, 665-71 (1952); Benjamin F.
Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel: Principles From Precedents: 11, 50 MICH. L. Rev. 873, 873-79
(1952); A.L.I. COMMENTARIES 1926, supra note 22, at 14-20.

72. 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22. The proposed promissory estoppel
section was numbered as § 88 in the 1926 report, but the number was changed to the familiar § 90 during succeeding reports.
73. See id. at 16 and § 88.
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Strict common law demands for definiteness, mutuality, reciprocity of bargain,7 4 and its attendant preexisting duty rule scuttled
attempts for more malleably structured relations. Mounting cases
of reliance harm, caused by doctrinal barriers to these unorthodox
arrangements, stimulated nineteenth century courts to ameliorate
the harshness generated by traditional rules applicable to contract
formation, modification, and termination. Courts justified granting reliance relief through extensions of theories found both at law
and in equity; the theories in support of this relief were typically
an admixture of legal and equitable notions. Archaic principles
opposed to flexible promises fueled growth in the role of justifiable
reliance in overcoming resultant unfairness.
In keeping with the focus of this study, the ensuing discussion
will consider exclusively case law decided prior to the dissemina75 of what
tion to the profession in early 1926 of the initial draft
became, in unaltered form, Section 90. The case law documents
that justifiable reliance had been a judicially recognized ground
for enforcement of commercial promises during at least the preceding seventy years, contrary to the claims of Restatement drafters and later legal commentators. Some of these pre-1926 judicial
opinions held reliance binding within the confines of the doctrine
of consideration, and others articulated justifiable reliance as an
independent doctrine. Current studies of justifiable reliance decisions prior to the first Restatement have analyzed development of
the actionability of justifiable reliance from the perspective of the
categories of transactions involved, e.g., charitable subscription,
familial gift, bailment, agency, etc. 6 In contrast, the approach
taken in the present study will be to analyze the evolution of binding justifiable reliance from the perspective of its binding effect on
commercial promises in ameliorating the harshness of specific
traditional doctrine that denied enforcement of promises drawn to
deal with uncertainty. Traditional contract rules were developed
74. See 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 449-51 (Samuel Williston ed.,
8" ed. 1893); WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK, supra note 22, at 34 n.39; LANGDELL,
SUMMARY, supra note 8, at § 79; HOLMES, supra note 12, at 292-94.
75. A.L.I. COMMENTARIES 1926, supra note 22, at § 88. The 1926 commentary to promissory estoppel was repeated verbatim in the 1928 commentary but with the section
changed to § 90, and the black letter statement of the promissory estoppel principle remained the same in 1928. Id. at 15-19; THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, sect. 90, 246-49 (1928).
76. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Boyer, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: PRINCIPLE FROM PRECEDENTS:
1, 639, 649; 665 (1952); Warren Shattuck, GratuitousPromise - A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L.
Rev. 908, 913-35 (1937).
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in the context of a static pre-industrial era to administer one-shot,
discrete promissory transactions of short duration. The focus will
be on decisions that emphasized the difference justifiable reliance
made in overcoming traditional contract law requirements applicable to offer and acceptance and to contract modifications. Doctrinal obstacles under offer and acceptance involved indefinite offers and the revocability of unilateral and at-will offers, and contract modification problems concerned the bargain demands of the
preexisting duty rule.
1.

Indefiniteness and Reliance

Drafters of long-term contracts were reluctant to hem themselves in with the definite language mandated by traditional contract doctrine" due to the swirl of uncertainties in an industrial
age. Complications inherent in an interdependent economy precipitated experimentation with flexible, open-ended contract language in the face of doctrinal demands for certainty and mutuality.8 The doctrine of mutuality, with its origins in offer and acceptance, presented a hurdle for offers flexibly crafted to accommodate an uncertain future and for offers for unilateral contracts.
Although a time lag existed between the introduced civilian notions of offer and acceptance,"9 it did not present a doctrinal challenge until Parsons, Harvard's influential contracts treatise
writer, emphasized in 1853 that a promisor was not bound until
there was "a promise for a promise, with entire mutuality of obligation."s° Parsons' verbiage can be found in countless judicial de77. The origins of the requirement of certainty were associated with the need to plead a
sum certain in the action of debt in the fifteenth century. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 6163. The dramatic shift in the economy generated the need to assure supply and demand in
an uncertain industrial market, thus making long-term contracts essential.
78. See, e.g., Work v. Welsh, 43 N.E. 719, 721 (Ill. 1896) (leaving exact location of four
acres on larger tract until later); Marion Water and Power Co. v. Town of Saucilito, 143 P.
767, 773 (Cal. 1914) ("best endeavors"); Whitman v. Worsted, 206 F. 549, 554 (1913) (postponing specification of exact sizes and styles of yarns).
79. Adams v. Lindsell. 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (1818). See Kennedy v. Lee, 36 Eng. Rep.
170, 175 (Ch. 1817) (Chancellor Eldon addressed the simultaneity issue: "[I1f, within a
reasonable time of the acceptance being communicated, no variation has been made by
either party in terms of the offer so made and accepted, the acceptance must be taken as
simultaneous with the offer."). Cf. Routledge v. Grant, 130 Eng. Rep. 920, 923-24 (1828)
(Chief Justice Best volunteered that it would be unacceptable that one party could be
bound while the other was not); Bowen v. Tipton, 1 A. 861, 863-64 (Md. 1885) (ruling that a
contract requires consensus reached by offeree "doing all that he is bound to do").
80. 1 PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 451 (1853) ("Until such engagement or such
doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it.").
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cisions during the second half of the century and beyond, and Williston would defend the requirement in his 1893 edition of Parsons
and in his 1906 edition of Pollock.8
The flawed doctrine of mutuality notwithstanding, as courts
came to realize that indefinite contract language mirrored the unpredictability of a modem economy, courts of law and equity found
certainty in a promisee's specific reliance on a promise. The scope
of the offer had to be certain in order to award expectation damages, but this was not vital in awarding reliance damages, which
could act as a surrogate to protect the expectation interest.8 2 In a
1910 opinion, an Arkansas court declared that indefiniteness and
lack of mutuality in a promise to pay for the output of goods produced was certain at least to the amount of goods "actually delivered."83 The defect of uncertainty alleged in a 1914 California case
resided in plaintiffs contract obligations of "due diligence" and
"best endeavors." The court concluded that even if the contract
was at first indefinite and lacking in mutuality, the actual efforts
of the plaintiff in performing his duties satisfied these demands.84
Actionable justifiable reliance provided a bridge between the time
when judicial demands of strict definiteness held sway, regardless
of hardship, and the broader modern contextual rule that implied
that consent to a duty of good faith performance can save some
open-ended contract language, even in the absence of reliance."
A trio of decisions emanating from the middle of the country,
rendered between 1887 and 1904, exemplified the challenges con81. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 449-51 (Samuel Williston ed., 8'
ed. 1893); WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK, supra note 22, at 34 n.39. Williston would not
retract his support for mutuality until 1920. See 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note
22, at § 140 (concluding that mutuality was an unnecessary way of saying there must be
consideration, giving guaranty contract as an example).
82. See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages:
2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 376-77 (1937).
83. El Dorado Ice and Planing Mill Co. v. Kinnard, 131 S.W. 460, 461-62 (Ark. 1910)
(saying certain and mutual as to that amount). See Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers
Oil Co., 64 So. 684, 686 (La. 1913) (holding that certainty and mutuality issues posed by
elective right of driller to determine number of drillings was solved by the number of wells
actually drilled); Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 117 S.E. at 714 (stating issues overcome
to extent of "reliance upon the representations and promises").
84. Marion Water and Power Co. v. Town of Saucilito, 143 P. 767, 773 (Cal. 1914) (describing contract to lay and maintain water pipe with due diligence).
85. New York introduced the notion of implied duty of good faith in contract performance. See Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendelson, 167 N.Y.S. 435 (1917); Wigand v. BachmannBechtel Brewing Co., 118 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1918). Wigand drew inspiration from a 1905 decision which required fiduciary obligations of railroad reorganization committee toward
bondholders. Id. at 619 see also Industrial & General Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9-10 (N.Y.
1905).
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tract drafters faced in contending with the rapidly-changing economy as the modern form of business corporation constructed the
infrastructure necessary for industrialization to proceed westward
across the continent.8 6 All three cases concerned landowners'
agreements to convey land for industrial projects, two for construction of railway lines and the third for a factory. In each case,
the precise metes and bounds of the tract to be conveyed were kept
indefinite until the industrial concern knew exactly where the installations were needed at the time of construction. After construction began, the landowners in each case raised the defenses
of indefiniteness and lack of mutuality, and all three courts ruled
that any indefiniteness or lack of mutuality before performance
began was no longer thus impaired after the reliance of commencement of construction performance clarified the precise location intended. The hurly-burly of the late nineteenth century
economy was further reflected in the fact that two of the three
cases involved business interests which were moving so quickly
that they had not been properly formed as corporations when the
agreements were struck.8 7
In Ottumwa, CedarFalls & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. McWilliams,8 an
Iowa court said uncertainty about metes and bounds of a planned
railway right of way was justified because of the unknown contingencies the railway company had to allow for as the line wound its
way toward the defendant's land. The defective legal description
was cured once the railway actually took possession and laid the
tracks. The court said, "Contracts are to be construed in light of
the facts surrounding the transaction, and known to the parties."8
In the second case, an Illinois court also took the modern perspective that only "reasonable certainty" was needed and would
depend on the subject matter, the contract's purpose, and the parties' relations. ° The promise to sell the land for a factory site was
no longer revocable for lack of mutuality and certainty once valuable improvements were made in reliance on the landowner's
promise.8 ' Relief was limited, however, to protection of the reli86. See Ottumwa, Cedar Falls & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. McWilliams, 32 N.W. 315 (Ia.
1887); Work v. Welsh, 43 N.E. 719 (Ill. 1896); Curry v. Kentucky Western Ry. Co., 78 S.W.
435 (Ky. 1904).
87. Work, 43 N.E. at 721; Curry, 78 S.W. at 436.
88. 32 N.W. 315 (Ia. 1887).
89. Ottumwa, 32 N.W. at 316.
90. Work, 43 N.E. at 721.
91. Id. (stating that construction work was "acceptance" and that consideration had
passed).
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ance interest for the amount of land occupied by the actual factory
site rather than for the number of acres originally promised.92
In the third case, the method of overcoming the defenses of uncertain subject matter and corporate identity in Curry v. Kentucky
Western Ry. Co.93 was the use of "estoppel" functioning as promissory estoppel. The Kentucky court noted, "The doctrine of estoppel prevents a landowner who has encouraged, actively or passively, the appropriation of his land . . ." from revoking his promise to convey after the now-formed corporation had occupied his
land.94
Uncertainties over supply and demand that cropped up before
the end of the nineteenth century stimulated parties to design
contracts to protect their interests, and these novel formats immediately raised definiteness and mutuality objections. Contractors drew requirement contracts to assure a buyer a supply of materials he might need or require in his business over a given period, and output contracts were drawn to assure demand for the
products the seller could produce. Output arrangements proved
attractive to producers who wanted to be sure of a market for
goods produced but did not want to be bound to produce a specific
amount for fear of the long-standing absolute contract principle.95
In a 1906 Kentucky case, a producer of railway ties offered a railway company to sell "all that [he] could furnish" for the next year.
After more than a thousand ties had been furnished and paid for,
the railway refused to take more. When later sued, the railway
defended on the grounds of lack of both certainty and mutuality,
but the court ruled that the uncertainty had been cured by part
performance of both parties" and that the plaintiff was eligible for
expectation damages for the part the defendant refused.97
92. Id. (concluding that remedy only needed to cover that part of land identified as
certain by construction of factory building).
93. 78 S.W. 435, 436 (Ky. 1904).
94. Curry, 78 S.W. at 436. Quoting Thompson, Commentaries On The Law Of Corporations, § 5279. The Kentucky court emphasized underlying policy that did not support removal of the fully-installed tracks available for "public use." Id.
95. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647) (ruling that defendant had to pay
land rent even though he had been ousted from the land by an invader during English civil
war).
96. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Coyle, 97 S.W. 772, 773 (Ky. 1906) ("The letters
which were uncertain were made definite by the conduct of the parties in construing them
and performing them.").
97. Louisville, 97 S.W. at 773-74 (holding that measure of damages for ties not yet
manufactured was difference between contract and market price). In appropriate cases,
specific performance could be available. Id. at 774.
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However, some jurisdictions were only willing to order reliance
damages for such open-ended output provisions. In El Dorado,98
the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff "for any" mill-cut yellow
pine he could secure from "any mill" for a stated period. The
plaintiff secured a mill, made preparations, produced lumber, and
delivered it to the defendant. The defendant later refused to go
through with the remainder of the deal on the grounds of indefiniteness,99 but the Arkansas court said that the indefiniteness issue was resolved to the extent of lumber delivered and accepted,
and granted reliance relief accordingly.' ° Subsequent to the part
performance in El Dorado, the parties modified the terms of their
relationship to cover the output plaintiff could generate from a
specific mill which the plaintiff had secured. For this portion, the
court protected plaintiffs expectation interest because the "entire
output of a mill of a known capacity" was "capable of an approximately accurate estimation." °' Thus the purchaser was only
bound to pay for the amount actually delivered under the output
terms of lumber from "any mill," but expectation damages could be
recovered when the output could be calculated with certainty for a
particular mill. Soon a producer in an output agreement was said
to have to comply with an implied duty of good faith in production;0 2 today recovery is permitted for "such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith."0 3
Early requirement contracts cases also limited plaintiffs to reliance damages when contract terms were not tied to the buyer's
needs, but courts would award expectation damages when the
quantity and quality of contract subject matter were tied to the
buyer's specific business requirements. When a buyer agreed to
buy as much fertilizer as he "may want or desire in his business,"
a 1914 Maryland decision held that the uncertain agreement was
binding only to the extent of fertilizer delivered.' 4 No recovery
98. 131 S.W. 460 (Ark. 1910).
99. El Dorado, 131 S.W. at 461 (Ark. 1910) (noting that the defendant also argued lack
of mutuality since the plaintiff was not bound to secure any lumber).
100. Id. at 462. In an 1879 New York case, an agreement to deliver the same quality of
lumber as delivered the previous winter, without an indication of quantity, was binding
only to extent of lumber actually delivered. Quick v. Wheeler, 78 N.Y. 300, 303-05 (1879).
101. El Dorado, 131 S.W. at 462.
102. See Wigand, 118 N.E. at 619-20 (ordering expectation damages). The plaintiffbuyer in this output contract could recover since he relied. Id.
103. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-203, 2-306 (1952).
104. Parks v. Griffith, 91 A. 581, 585 (Md. 1914); cf. Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535
(1873) (stating that promise to supply all pig-iron buyer might "want" lacked mutuality
because no obligation on buyer to want).
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was permitted for possible future deliveries, however, because the
amount the buyer might "want" was not ascertainable. The court
added in dictum that a seller could recover expectation damages
for a definite amount that could be calculated based on a contract
5
term for goods the buyer "needed" or "required" in his business"
This approach was a precursor of the application of an implied
good faith duty on a buyer to require an amount consistent with
buyer's business needs.' 6 And a buyer who had relied upon a requirement agreement could recover expectation damages based on
07
the quantity the buyer needed in his business as well.
2.

Revocability of UnilateralOffers Subsequent to Reliance

Up to around a decade prior to publication of the first Restatement, plaintiffs experienced difficulties in enforcing offers for
commercial contracts which were either unilateral' 8 or indefinite
because of the unfortunate requirement of mutuality. Since the
mutuality notion provided that neither party to a transaction was
bound until both parties were bound, an offeror could revoke unilateral, at-will, and indefinite offers even after an offeree was in
the process of performance, irrespective of the offeree's hardship.
Thus, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, an
offeror was generally not bound even once an offeree had partly
performed because the offeree was not legally obliged to complete
performance." 9 Despite the fact that the requirement of mutuality
105. Parks, 91 A. at 585 (saying there was a lack of mutuality and consideration if based
on what buyer might "want" but that a quantity determined by amount "required" was
"ascertainable ... with reasonable certainty"). The court cited Wells v. Alexandre in support of point that amount "needed" or "required" was sufficient. Id.; Wells v. Alexandre,
130 N.Y. 642, 644-45 (1891) (interpreting contract to base quantity on the actual business
requirements of buyer).
106. See Asahel Wheeler, 167 N.Y.S. at 436-37; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-203, 2306 (1952). When a buyer ordered goods in requirement contract far in excess of his needs
after market price had more than doubled, the court found that the buyer acted outside the
parties' contemplation by taking undue advantage in absence of real business need. Id. at
437; cf. Wells, 130 N.Y. at 645 (emphasizing that rule of reason must apply when seller
entirely at mercy of buyer).
107. See Fontaine v. Baxley, 17 S.E. 1015, 1018 (Ga. 1892) (holding that measure of
buyer's damages was quantity buyer would have needed in transactions over the year
stated). See also 1 Arthur L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 156 (1950) (saying to "require" is the equivalent of to "need").
108. The use of the term "unilateral" to identify an offer anticipating acceptance by
performance was employed in the first Restatement, and, though it was present in the early
discussions about a second restatement, it was ultimately dropped from Restatement Second due to the confusion it created. It is used in this study with that proviso.
109. See 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 448 (5' ed. 1866) (promoting
the model of a promise for a promise where "there is an absolute mutuality of engagement,
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had not been a part of contract law prior to the nineteenth century, mutuality's success from around the middle of the nineteenth century until the 1920s caused significant hardship for contractors who attempted to adapt their relations to the unpredictability of the modern economy by structuring their transactions in
the form of unilateral contracts, at-will relationships, or with sufficient indefiniteness to permit flexible adjustments.1 10 Mutuality
was surely the single-most important doctrinal stimulus to the
growth of equitable relief from justifiable reliance hardship during
the fifty years after the Civil War.
Langdell and Williston strictly applied Parsons' mutuality notion to the issue of revocability of a unilateral contract offer despite the reliance hardship of an offeree's good faith part performance. 1 ' This dogmatic refusal to make provisions for reliance
hardship can be seen in an 1890 Minnesota judicial opinion that
offered solutions to the mutuality problem in either completion of
performance before revocation or re-negotiation as a bilateral conThese suggestions were disingenuous, since it would be
tract.'
too late to complete performance once revocation occurred, and an
offeror with market power might refuse to agree to loss of maneuverability.
Despite the attempts of formalist treatise writers to stamp out
reliance relief for unilateral contract offerees, American case law
rulings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued mixed as some supported Parsons' position while others
redressed justifiable reliance. The decisions that provided relief
circumvented the mutuality requirement either by making an equitable exception for reliance hardship or by rationalizing that
part performance cured the lack of mutuality or acted as an accepso that each party has the right at once to hold the other to a positive agreement");
LANGDELL SUMMARY, supra note 7, at § 4; WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK, supra note 22, at
34 n.39; Shattuck, supra note 76, at 938 n. 93 (listing string of case citations).
110. Cf Shattuck, supra note 76, at 935 (commenting that unilateral offers were usually
structured for business purposes).
111. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, § 4 (citing English guaranty decision Offord
v. Davies); 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 449-51 (1853). Williston admitted that mutuality's sting was "troublesome" due to the "practical hardship" for the
offeree, but "on principle" he was bothered that the offeree would not be bound to complete
the performance commenced. WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK, supra note 22, at 34 n. 39.
Theophilus Parsons (1797-1882), Christopher C. Langdell (1826-1906) and Samuel Williston (1861-1963) taught contracts at Harvard Law School during successive generations. Id.
112. Stensgaard v. Smith, 44 N.W. 669, 670 (Minn. 1890); Accord Gray v. Hinton, 7 F.
81, 84-85 (Cir. Ct. App. Nebr. 1881) (saying act of acceptance had to be fully performed to
make promise "mutual and obligatory").

34
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tance. Judicial opinions at the turn of the twentieth century in
California and Kentucky exemplified this trend. In Los Angeles
Traction Co. v. Wilshire, a California court ruled that, after a contractor had expended funds and started construction, "[ilt would
be manifestly unjust thereafter to permit the offer that had been
made to be withdrawn."1 13 A Kentucky court in Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Coyle observed that despite the lack of mutuality when a railroad company offered to buy the railroad ties the
plaintiff could produce in one year, that by plaintiff electing to perform, "the want of mutuality is thereby eliminated.""4
Some courts held that an offeror, who hindered an offeree's ability to complete performance, was barred from revoking115 or that
the hindrance was the equivalent of completion of performance." 6
When the facts were egregious enough, some courts concluded
that conduct akin to fraud occurred when an offeror revoked after
inducing part performance.
A Wisconsin court reasoned in
Zwolanek v. Baker Manufacturing Co."' that when a company induced workers to hire on and to stay in service with assurances of
participation in the company's profit sharing plan, the company
committed near fraud to fire plaintiff just before the eligibility period was reached. The employer further compromised its position
by claiming that the benefits were intended only for officers and
113. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 67 P. 1086, 1088 (Cal. 1902); see Blumenthal
v. Goodall, 26 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1891) (stating it would be "height of injustice" to permit
offer to be revoked after reliance). A refusal to take into account the hardship of reliance
left the offeree with the possibility of recovery in restitution, but unjust enrichment was
often absent. See Bigger v. Owen, 5 S.E. 193 (Ga. 1887) (applying mutuality demand
strictly); Fuller & Perdue (pt. 2), supra note 82, at 416 (lamenting that offeree of unilateral
contract has no way to protect self). A unilateral contract is a stronger case for allowing
reliance protection than a firm offer because a unilateral offeree can do nothing to protect
himself except to complete performance, but an offeree can accept a firm offer.
114. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 97 S.W. at 773 (Ky. 1906); see Phelps v. Townsend,
25 Mass. 392, 393 (1829) (part performance outweighed lack of mutuality defense); Williams v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 438, 439 (1883); (holding donor "became bound" when part performance of charity fulfilled "mutuality of engagement," citing Parsons' treatise); Plumb v.
Campbell, 18 N.E. 790, 792 (Ill. 1888) (concluding that beginning part performance supplied mutuality); Hopkins v. Racine Malleable & Wrought Iron Co., 119 N.W. 301, 303 (Wis.
1909) (remarking that mutuality was "essential" but "rule has received modification to the
extent" of performance); Watkins v. Davison, 112 P. 743, 745 (Wash. 1911) (explaining part
performance of unilateral offer solved any mutuality issue); Cloe v. Rogers, 121 P. 201, 203
(Okla. 1912) (concluding that reliance cost and part performance answered want of mutuality).
115. See Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107-08 (Me. 1917) (saying offeree "primarily at fault"); see also Blumenthal, 26 P. at 908 (emphasizing offeror ought not take advantage of his own wrong).
116. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Goodnight, 73 Ky. 552, 554 (1874).
117. 137 N.W. 769 (Wis. 1912).
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shareholders of the company."' Other types of wrongs found relevant included an offeror's negligence and violation of requirements
set by the offeror himself.1 19
Judicial relief granted to offerees prior to the first Restatement
was justified on scattered grounds, some of which were doctrinally
indefensible. This muddled state was exacerbated by the absence
of doctrinal guidance from leading contracts treatise writers because of their resistance to such relief until the second decade of
the twentieth century. Without the lead of influential academic
writers, who generated the mutuality mess in the first place, a
growing number of court decisions provided equitable relief based
on confused terminology and doctrine, and attorneys' arguments
in support of offerees' reliance claims were rife with bewildering
nomenclature. 20 Fuzzy judicial thinking included added analysis
and misuse of equitable estoppel, 2 ' mutuality, unilateral contracts, and the statute of frauds part performance exception. The
troublesome requirement of mutuality in unilateral contracts was
canvassed earlier, and it will be seen again in the coverage of atwill contracts. The application of the misguided mutuality requirement added on top of the doctrine of consideration in unilateral contracts led to unnecessary disorder and unfairness.
118. Zwolanek, 137 N.W. at 771-72, 773 (Employer defended on ground that written
contracts reserved benefit "for members of the corporation."); contra Note, Offer and Acceptance, 26 HARV. L. REV. 274, 274 (1912) (submitting that Zwolnek v. Baker was wrong to
bind offeror when acceptance not pursuant to all terms of offer). See Fontaine v. Baxley, 17
S.E. 1015, 1018 (Ga. 1892) (remarking that "it would be a fraud" to induce offeree's substantial performance and then revoke); cf. Erskine, 117 S.E. at 712) (asserting manufacturing would be guilty of fraud if it induced performance without intending to perform).
119. See, e.g., The Vigo Agricultural Society v. Brumfiel, 1 N.E. 382, 385-86 (Ind. 1885)
(involving theft of plaintiffs property placed with defendant-bailee for an exhibition where
defendant negligently failed to station police after assurance of safekeeping); Sunflower
Bank v. Pitts, 66 So. 810, 812 (Miss. 1914) (stating that bank was a "wrongdoer" to sell
land, while plaintiff was agent to sell it, at price below the minimum price at which the
bank said that neither it nor the agent could sell it).
120. See, e.g., Watkins v. Davison, 112 P. 743, 744 (Wash. 1911) (Attorney claimed seller
gave "unilateral acceptance," but court called it a unilateral offer); Axe v. Tolbert, 146 N.W.
418, 420 (Mich. 1914) (Attorney claimed real estate firm obtained "options" to sell farms,
but court said intent was to grant the firm agency authority.); cf. G. Ober & Sons Co. v.
Katzenstein, 76 S.E. 476, 477-78 (N.C. 1912) (calling at-will contract an option to cancel).
121. See Curry, 78 S.W. at 436. Equitable estoppel bars a person from claiming that the
true facts are different from what he misrepresented them to be, but promissory estoppel
supports enforcement of a promise for future performance.
122. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration,34 YALE L. J. 571,
573, 586-87 (1925) (asserting that the idea that both parties must be bound or neither is
bound was never true of unilateral contract). Williston would not insist on the inclusion of
mutuality in the Restatement. See 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22, § 140 (acknowledging that mutuality is unnecessary way of saying there must be consideration).
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Further confused thinking emanated from attempts to remove a
contract from the perceived pitfall of the unilateral box by judicial
declarations that an offeree's part performance converted a unilateral contract into a bilateral contract. 2 3 As an Illinois court put
it in Plumb v. Campbell, part performance transmuted the unilateral contract into Parsons' paradigm for all binding contracts of "a
promise for a promise, with entire mutuality of obligation."'24 This
was an inaccurate transfer of a classification since, unlike bilateral contract, a unilateral offeree was not bound to complete the
Erroneous thinking was prepartial performance commenced.'
sent as well in unilateral contracts involving the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds, since overcoming the statute
facilitated an unspoken, backdoor method to assume, without
26
analysis, the existence of both consideration and mutuality.
Then, during the second decade of the twentieth century, several academics began to write in support of the increasing instances of judicial relief given unilateral offerees on account of
reliance hardship. Academic writers, and eventually drafters of
the Restatements of the law, set about suggesting cures to the defective doctrine enunciated in the case law as a means to order the
law and thereby encourage the fairness obtained in these decisions. Judicial opinions prior to the 1920s rationalized relief as an
equitable exception to the mutuality requirement or under the
rationale that offeree's part performance answered the demand for
mutuality either because it supplied the mutuality or there was
now a promise for a promise. By around 1910, academics began to
exhibit an interest in active support for the equitable results
123. See, e.g., Los Angeles Traction Co., 67 P. at 1088 (stating that part performance
barred revocation and also converted unilateral into bilateral contract); (Buick Motor Co. v.
Thompson, 75 S.E. 354, 356 (Ga. 1912); Plumb, 18 N.E. at 792; Edwards v. Roberts, 209
S.W. 247, 251 (Tex. 1918) (saying it ceased to be unilateral contract and became bilateral).
124. Plumb, 18 N.E. at 792 (citing Parsons' mutuality ideas).
125. Cf WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22, § 60 (arguing that if part performance is enough to convert a unilateral into a bilateral contract, then the offeror is being
denied the right to dictate the terms of his offer). The classifications unilateral and bilateral were dropped from the Restatement Second because of the confusion they caused.
126. See, e.g., The American Publishing and Engraving Co. v. Walker, 87 Mo. App. 503,
509 (1901) (saying part performance cured statute of frauds and unilateral objections); cf.
Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 35-36 (1857) (commenting that part performance cured statute of frauds and mutuality concerns); Fontaine v. Baxley, 17 S.E. 1015, 1018 (Ga. 1892).
The inclination to equate the statute of frauds part performance exception with the reliance
needed to bar revocation of a unilateral contract is perhaps not surprising in a license case
like Wynn, in that the statute of frauds part performance exception, created to avert a
fraudulent invocation of the statute, influenced early cases that provided justifiable reliance relief in land license and easement cases.
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achieved in the courts, but the trick was how to convert that equitable impulse into unassailable contract doctrine in order to encourage its healthy growth.'27
In 1910 Professor Ashley observed in the cases that granted offerees reliance relief the suggestion of "estoppel" at work,'28 and he
encouraged the open application of a device like estoppel to bar
revocation after an offeree's reliance. 129 Ashley admitted that the
facts of the cases did not strictly fall under equitable estoppel, but
he said that "[a] doctrine somewhat analogous thereto and depending upon the same ideas would seem to be possible, even
Four
though there may be some more suitable nomenclature."'
years later, Professor McGovney weighed in to advance what
would prove to be the most influential suggestion of a sound theoretical approach to avert reliance hardship caused by an offeror's
revocation."' McGovney was uneasy about Ashley's estoppel proposal because it involved "stretching the doctrine of estoppel beyond the vaguest meaning in which it is now applied," and he
thought the proposal would "scarcely meet with approval." 32 In
order to defeat the barriers presented by the dogma of mutuality
and bargain, McGovney reached for inspiration beyond the common law system by ferreting out a mid-nineteenth century civilian
dissent, and in part, by following the ruminations of English treatise writer Pollock. McGovney highlighted an 1852 dissent to a
Louisiana case of an offer for a reward, wherein Judge Preston
argued that after part performance, the plaintiffs "acquired an
inchoate right" that barred the offeror's revocation. 3
Pollock agreed with the equitable outcome Ashley's proposal
would effectuate, as did McGovney, but Pollock characterized the
estoppel notion as "legal sophistry. '34 Pollock borrowed from
127. See Clarence D. Ashley, Offers Calling for Consideration Other than a Counter
Promise, 23 HARV. L. REV. 159, 161, 165-66 (1910) (noting constant effort to devise way out
of the difficulty that consideration is not given until offeree's act completed). Ashley
thought perhaps legislation would be necessary. Id. at 159.
128. Id. at 163 (citing as example Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire).
129. Id. at 166.
130. Id. at 168.
131. McGovney, supra note 59, at 659.
132. Id. at 657.
133. Cornelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 7 La. Ann. 345, 347 (1852). McGovney also mentioned dicta in well known English and American decisions, though both decisions offered
the solution he opposed of the offeree being bound as well at part performance. McGovney,
supra note 59, at 656; see Offord v. Davies, 142 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1338 (1862) (commenting
that offeror of guaranty contract bound upon creditor's part performance); Plumb, 18 N.E.
at 792 (saying part performance binds offeror and provides mutuality).
134. FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 26 (8 ed. 1911).
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French law the idea that an "acceptance is complete" as soon as an
offeree makes an "unequivocal beginning of the performance requested."'35 McGovney perceived two offers being made in a unilateral contract offer: first, the principal offer to sell or buy, and,
second, a "collateral offer to keep the principal offer open for a
reasonable time if the offeree begins performance."'36 McGovney's
implied collateral offer was inspired by the nineteenth century
consensual theory contribution permitting courts to imply terms
in order to inject fairness into common law contract. Common law
courts had been utilizing the fiction of implied consent as a matter
of law in order to incorporate uniform equity into contract doctrine
for a century prior to McGovney's article. 37
Williston rejected McGovney's proposal in 1921 because of the
lack of precedent to support his idea. He admitted the probable
advantage to business interests of irrevocability but thought "recognized principles of contract" could only be overcome by "invention of new ones," which he was unwilling to propose.'3 8 Between
the publication of Williston's treatise in 1921 and the first Restatement draft in 1925, Williston's mind was changed about irrevocable unilateral offers after he joined forces on the Restatement drafting committee with Yale law professors Corbin and
McGovney,'3 9 two of the four drafters active on the project. The
result of their collective efforts was a solution that was obviously
influenced by McGovney's suggestions in 1914. The solution
enunciated in Section 45 stated that an offeree's part performance
held an offeror to a binding implied "subsidiary promise" to not
revoke for a reasonable time. 140 The lamented requirement of mutuality was now proclaimed to be wrong.'

135. Id.
136. Id. at 659.
137. The civilian implication of terms to contracts generally are found in the law regarding merchantability, impossibility and good faith. See TEEVEN, HISTORY OF CONTRACT,
supra note 3, at 139, 232-35, 309.
138. 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra note 22, at § 60. Corbin supported irrevocability of offer on the grounds of policy, convenience and general advantage. Arthur L. Corbin,
Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 186, 195
(1917) [hereinafter Corbin, Offer and Acceptance].
139. Williston and Corbin were obvious choices, but McGovney's selection surely reflected the importance of the doctrinal concerns of the time regarding the status of unilateral contracts and the deleterious impact of the mutuality requirement.
140.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1932). The modern English

common law position is that a unilateral offer is irrevocable after performance begins if a
court's reading of the contract itself indicates that was the offeror's intent, leaving open the
possibility that an offeror could revoke after performance began if that was found to be
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Options and Firm Offers

The specific unilateral contract categories of offers for option
contracts and offers for guaranty contracts present their own particular problems; a byproduct of the development of solutions contributed to the growth of justifiable reliance. This sub-section will
cover options and the one following will address guaranty contracts. 4 2 Options intended to be irrevocable for a brief period are
often labeled "firm" offers. 43 When a merchant stated an offer was
"firm," the commercial understanding might have been that it was
irrevocable, but the offer was revocable as a matter of contract law
in the absence of consideration." By the latter part of the nineteenth century, this began to change in cases of reliance on the
firm offer.' In contrast to unilateral offers generally, the reliance
on a promise of irrevocability frequently involved a form of substantial reliance that did not necessarily include part performance
For instance, in Wilson v. Spry, the offeree's
of contract terms.'
reliance came in the form of extensive examinations of timber

offeror's intent. See MICHAEL P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FURMSTON'S LAW OF
CONTRACT 64-66 (2001).
141. See RESTATEMENT

OF THE

LAW OF

CONTRACTS §

12 cmt.

b (1932);

accord

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. f (1981) (elaborating that the requirement
that both parties be bound was inapplicable to unilateral contracts, reliance-based obligations, moral obligation and negotiable instruments).
142. Offers for both options and guaranties share the requirement that reliance be substantial. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87, 88(c) (1981).

As to a written

guaranty, reliance is extremely probable in a "commercial context." Id. at § 88 cmt. d. The
provisions in Sections 87 and 88 were not in the first Restatement.
143. See Fuller and Perdue (pt. 2), supra note 82, at 416 (explaining that when an offer
is "firm," there is a stated period of irrevocability to distinguish it from other types of options); U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 4 (1952) (clarifying that a "firm" offer is not a long-term option
in modern usage). Not all option offers make assurances of irrevocability of the offer like a
firm offer does, but if there is reliance on an option or a firm offer, the result is the same.
144. See A.L.I. UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial
Code), Proposed Final Draft No. 1, § 18 cmt. (Karl Llewellyn reptr. 1944) (commenting that
firm offers were so relied upon by merchants that they rarely came into case law, and when
they did, it was because of "revocation in bad faith"); Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer
Puzzle: A Study of Business Practices in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237,
260(1952), supra note 144, at 245-46 (discussing Louisiana case that remanded for proof on
whether trade custom was that firm offer irrevocable); cf. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 4 (1952)
(stating custom may not replace established legal rules); 1 CORBIN, supra note 107 § 43; cf
JOHN DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES 207 (1980) [hereinafter DAWSON, GIFTS] (explaining
that consideration concerns contract formation but has been confused with irrevocable
offers and contract discharge).
145. See, e.g., Work, 43 N.E. at 721; Fontaine, 17 S.E. at 1018.
146. This potential difference is reflected in the Restatement Second stance that substantial reliance is sufficient for an option but part performance is required for other types
of unilateral contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT §§ 87(2), 45 (1981).
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14 7
property in order to determine the value of the property offered,
and in Spitzli v. Guth, a lessee made substantial improvements to
leased property in reliance on a promise to extend a lease. 14 Each
of these decisions, rendered in the year 1920, treated the subsequent substantial reliance as the nineteenth century species of
consideration reviled by Langdell and Holmes and noted by Corbin
as the "so-called estoppel theory of consideration."'49 That is, justifiable reliance was treated in some jurisdictions as a ground, independent of bargain, for finding sufficient consideration.
Cases of reliance on commercial options of particular importance involved contractors bidding on contracts."0 Notwithstanding opposition to binding reliance during the second quarter of the
twentieth century, 5 ' legal history shows that options in the form
of bids were actionable, if relied upon, by the late nineteenth century. A good example of this protection of the reliance interest
was the 1892 Georgia decision Fontaine v. Baxley."' A railroad tie
manufacturer in Georgia offered to supply ties at a set price for
one year if the buyer's bids to sell ties were accepted by New York
Georgia's Chief Justice Bleckley said that
railway companies.'
the tie manufacturer could have repudiated for lack of mutuality
"before [buyer] had incurred trouble and expense in complying
with it on his part."'54 The buyer had relied on the manufacturer's

147. 223 S.W. 564, 568-69 (Ark. 1920) (noting examination costs of $25 per day on property offered at $250,000).
148. Spitzli v. Guth, 183 N.Y.S. 743, 745 (1920); see Work, 43 N.E. at 721 (land improved
substantially in reliance on offer to convey).
149. Wilson, 223 S.W. at 568-69 (ruling examination of land subsequent to 45 day option
was consideration); Spitzli, 183 N.Y.S. at 747 (ruling that improvements, which lessor
aware of, provided "consideration which related back to the original agreement");
LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8 § 79; HOLMES, supra note 12, at 292-94; Corbin, Offer
and Acceptance, supra note 138, at 189; see Work, 43 N.E. at 721.
150. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); Northwestern
Engineering Co., 10 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1943); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757
(Cal. 1958).
151. See James Baird Co, 64 F.2d at 346 (Hand, J.).
152. 17 S.E. 1015 (Ga. 1892). A bid at an auction is a revocable offer revocable until
accepted. See Payne v. Cave, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (1789).
153. The court inartfully said that the parties had an "agreement" but that the manufacturer's promise to meet the buyer's requirements was a unilateral promise, since the offeror
could withdraw before the offer was acted upon. Subsequent to reliance, however, the
manufacturer was obliged to supply as many ties as the buyer-counterclaimant "might
need." Fontaine, 117 S.E. at 1018. A counterclaim was involved in Fontaine v. Baxley
because the manufacturer had sued for a modest amount due on an earlier delivery, but the
issue on appeal concerned the defendant's counterclaim in recoupment for reliance harm
suffered in connection with bids submitted to railway companies.
154. Fontaine, 17 S.E. at 1018. As with the subcontractor in Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., the manufacturer here did not bargain for the reliance of submitting a bid to railways;
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offer to sell railway ties by traveling from Georgia to New York,
setting up office in New York, submitting bids to New York railway companies based on the manufacturer's price set, landing
contracts with two railways and securing assurances he had submitted low bids on three upcoming contracts."' The court concluded that it would be a "fraud" to permit revocation after subThe manufacturer's promise to supply the ties
stantial reliance.'
needed to fulfill contracts at a stated price was held irrevocable
once the buyer reasonably relied on the supplier's promises of
quantity and price in making his bids to railway companies, 5 7 at
least as to the two contracts actually formed with railways.'
The outcome in Fontainev. Baxley was the same as that reached
by Justice Traynor on parallel facts in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
sixty-six years later, but the judicial opinions in each case approached the problem from different perspectives. The rationale
in Fontaine v. Baxley reflected the nineteenth century natural law
sensibilities of a jurisdiction comfortable with employing an approach from equity to produce a common law solution. The Georgia court averted a fraud, in equity, by barring revocation of a unilateral offer that had induced the reliance of partial acceptance.
This answer was borrowed from a practice in equity that barred
the potential fraud of raising the statute of frauds to defend
against an oral promise after it had induced part performance.'
On the other hand, Traynor combined common law bargain with
consensual notions by analogizing the subcontractor's bid to a unilateral offer falling under Restatement Section 45. Although the
subcontractor did not bargain for plaintiffs justifiable reliance on
the subcontractor's bid, Traynor said a fictional implied "subsidinevertheless, the manufacturer had reason to expect his bid to be incorporated in bids to
railways. Id.; Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60.
155. Fontaine, 17 S.E. at 1018. The damages measure was the quantity Fontaine could
succeed in pre-engaging within one year. Id.
156. Id.
157. The court emphasized that counterclaimant had no alternative supply readily
available in the market. Id.
158. As to the three bids, he had assurances that he had submitted the lowest bid; a
determination would have to be made about whether reliance was sufficient for them. Id.
If offer is for a potential series of unilateral contracts, reliance on one does not bind offeror
to remaining transactions in series. See Hopkins v. Racine Malleable & Wrought Iron Co.,
119 N.W. 301,303 (Wis. 1909).
159. See Butcher v. Stapley, 1 Vern. 363 (1686); Thynne v. Thynne, 23 Eng. Rep. 459
(1684); Halfpenny v. Ballet, 2 Vern. 373 (1699); LeFevre v. LeFevre, 4 S.&R. 241, 244 (Pa.
1818). See also SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 616. The court in Fontaine, said it would be a
fraud to repudiate after reliance and that this part performance satisfied both mutuality
and statute of frauds. Fontaine, 17 S.E. at 1018.
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ary promise" arose to not revoke after reliance.16 ° As in unilateral
contract offers generally, this left open the question of whether the
relied was obliged in the end to accept the
protected offeree who
16 1
subcontractor's bid.
In order to obtain just results, Traynor reintroduced a reliance
theory to bind suppliers to their commercial bids relied upon when
general contractors calculated their own bids.'62 Judge Hand had
demanded a bargained-for, or at the least consensual, ground to
bar revocation, and he decried the loss of the consensual solution
the seal provided.'63 A decade later, U.C.C. Reporter Llewellyn
crafted a consensual substitute for the sealed bid in the form of a
proposed statutory firm offer rule,164 but then this was not the first
civilian experimentation to replace the loss of the seal with the
signed writing formality of the commercial age.' 6 ' Still, the statutory solution would not protect the reliance interest if a bidder
refused to extend a firm offer in compliance with statutory formality.
(b)

Guaranty Contracts

The issue of lack of mutuality in this unilateral contract category had been rejected by the English judge Parke early in the
development of the obstructive notion of mutuality in the nineteenth century. In 1839, Parke observed, "But a great number of
cases are of contracts not binding on both sides at time when

160. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760 (saying contractor had reason to expect his bid to be
incorporated in general contractor's bid).
161. Id. The court in Fontaine v. Baxley suggested that the victimized offeree was bound
to order all the railway ties needed from the offeror-manufacturer. Fontaine, 17 S.E. at
1018. Although this solution was flawed in theory since the unilateral offeree was not
bound to complete the deal with the offeror, it did provide a lead for legislatures to consider. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 144 § 46 (discussing statutory and civilian treatment of
some bids as irrevocable). A mid-twentieth century survey of Indiana contractors' sense of
fair play indicated that 65 of 90 contractors surveyed felt obliged to contract with a subcontractor if the contractor awarded contract. See Franklin M. Schultz, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
237, 260 (1952).
162. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760.
163. James BairdCo., 64 F.2d at 346.
164. In a 1944 preliminary draft leading to of U.C.C. § 2-205, Llewellyn proposed a
statutory firm offer rule. A.L.I. UNIFORM SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code), Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (Karl L. Llewellyn, reptr. 1944).
165. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 144, at § 46 (mentioning statutes as early as 1914 in
Maryland and 1941 in NewYork and civilian rule of irrevocability for deliberate promises).
See also Armed Services Procurement Regulation § 2-203, 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 401.303
(1951) (barring revocation of bid to U.S. Government).
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made." 6 ' Baron Parke continued that in the case of a guaranty
contract, the party indemnified is not bound to extend credit, but
if he does so, then the guaranty becomes binding.'6 7 Parke's comment that an extension of credit in reliance on the guaranty promise was necessary to bind the guarantor was corroborated in the
well known 1862 English guaranty decision Offord v. Davies.68
That court said a guaranty promise was "conditioned" and only
became "binding if (the creditor] acts upon it," and until it was "at
least in part fulfilled the [guarantors] have the power of revoking
it."'69 Guaranty contracts had been binding at common law for
centuries prior to the nineteenth century; due to their unique nature, they were one of the few instances, prior to the industrial
age, in which there was a need for transactions to be designed
with a suspension of time between the offer and the acceptance.
In the United States, Professor Parsons, and later his disciple
Langdell, wrestled with how to find guaranty contracts in conformity with the invented doctrine of mutuality. Parsons declared
that once the creditor relied by extending credit, mutuality's
magical moment had arrived in the form of a promise for a promise.17 ° Langdell, on the other hand, did not deny the binding nature of a guaranty contract at common law, but he nevertheless
huffed that Offord v. Davies was one of the "ingenious attempts" to
avoid a hardship by declaring an offer irrevocable once performance had begun. Langdell said, "Such a view seems to have no
principle to rest upon.
Those nineteenth century American judicial opinions that held
guaranty promises binding on account of reliance tended to invoke
equitable estoppel more than other unilateral contract categories
like options and firm offers. Estoppel was perhaps perceived to be
a useful device due to the peculiarity of the reliance redounding to
the benefit of a third party rather than the promisor. The claimed
applicability of equitable estoppel to a guaranty was often erroneous, however, since there was, in essence, injurious reliance on a
promise for future action as opposed to equitable estoppel's bar

166. Kennaway v. Treleavan, 151 Eng. Rep. 211, 212 (1839).
167. Id. accord Whittle v. Frankland, 121 Eng. Rep. 992, 994-95 (1862) (Crompton, J.
stated in dictum in a criminal case that, "I never could understand that mutuality doctrine," as in case of guaranty where the only question is about consideration).
168. 142 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1340 (1862).
169. Offord, 142 Eng. Rep. at 1340.
170. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 451 (1853).
171. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8 § 4.
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from claiming facts different from those misrepresented.17 2 Thus,
in the 1864 Connecticut decision Rice v. Almy, 73 the guarantor
induced a creditor to relinquish his lien on his debtor's machinery,
so that the guarantor could buy the machinery, in exchange for
the defendant's guaranty of a new note signed by the debtor. The
court claimed that equitable estoppel applied,1 74 but where was the
misrepresentation of fact? The creditor had relied on the guarantor's promise to answer for any default by the debtor on the note
in the future, and a reporter's note to the opinion inferred as
much.175 Rice v. Almy provided early support for the innovation by
American courts of law and equity that injurious reliance qualified
as consideration. 7 ' The case reporter saw the shift and questioned
whether it was necessary to invent some new definition of consideration.17 7 Doctrinal concerns notwithstanding, the injection of the
reliance impulse in equitable estoppel into the doctrine of consideration was in full swing.
One other important question concerned reliance on the common commercial practice of giving a guaranty promise to cover a
series of future credit extensions, as in a letter of credit or an open
line of credit. Did the reliance of the first credit extension in the
series bind the guarantor to the whole series? In Offord v. Davies, 7' the defendant guaranteed that a draper would honor bills
of exchange issued by the plaintiff for the next twelve months.
One credit extension had been honored by the draper before the
guarantor revoked midway in the year. The guarantor defended
on the ground that he had revoked before any further reliance on
his guaranty promise. 9 The court adopted the measured resolu-

172. See, e.g., Rice v. Almy, 32 Conn. 297, 304 (1864); Winham v. Crutcher, 78 Tenn.
610, 615, 623-25 (1882); Litzelman v. Howell, 20 Ill. App. 588, 589-90 (1886).
173. 32 Conn. 297 (1864).
174. Rice, 32 Conn. at 304 (estoppel in pais).
175. Id. at 307-08 (disagreeing that equitable estoppel could enforce an agreement if
consideration was not also present).
176. Id. at 304 (asserting that if "promise induces promisee" to act, there is sufficient
consideration). See BIGELOW, supra note 58, at 441; WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK, supra
note 22, at 186-87 n.(d); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 129 n.2
(Arthur L. Corbin ed., 4h American ed. 1924).
177. Rice, 32 Conn. at 306. The reporter admitted, however, that this form of consideration was sometimes found. Id. at 307-08 (saying consideration and estoppel "perfectly
coincide here").
178. Offord, 142 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
179. Id. at 1336. The opinion contained the oft-quoted hypothetical discussed by Justices Williams and Erle about the guaranty to a manufacturer of the buyer's payment for a
carriage. Id. at 1338. The conclusion was reached that the guarantor could revoke up to
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tion that if a part of an extension was made before revocation,
then the defendant would be bound for the whole of that extension
in the series, but a revocation would be ineffective as to all remaining potential extensions in the series for which no reliance
had yet occurred. 8 °
3.

Revocability of At-Will Contracts Subsequent to Reliance

The right to revoke at-will contracts runs parallel to the right to
revoke unilateral offers in that an at-will agreement does not
commence if performance does not actually begin, and at-will relations are structured to permit contractors to terminate their relationship at any time. The types of relationships involved, often
resembling traditional employment relations or extensions
thereof, include agency, distributorship, exclusive sales arrangements, franchises, licenses and other related revocable contractual
relations. 1 The traditional common law presumption that an employment relationship ran year-to-year 2 was called into question
as relationships in the distributive chain became more complex in
an industrial market.' Treatise writer Wood declared that unless
an employee could prove to the contrary, the new employment
contract paradigm was "at will."8 4 Modem studies have established that Wood disingenuously cited authority that did not supHowever, the proposition proved atport his audacious claim.'
age
keen to facilitate corporate matractive to an instrumental
neuverability to react rapidly to turbulent markets; by the late
the point when manufacturer had prepared materials for manufacture of carriage. Id.
(citing Parsons' treatise, characterized as an American work of considerable authority).
180. Id. at 1340. See Fuller & Perdue (pt. 2), supra note 81, at 414 (pointing out that
Offord court took "middle ground" by allowing revocation of extensions not made); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88 cmt. d (1981) (commenting that the typical
remedy is performance of guaranty, thus avoiding measurement difficulties).
181. See, e.g., G. Ober & Sons v. Katzenstein, 76 S.E. 476 (N.C. 1912) (revocable purchase order); Caddo Oil v. Producers Oil, 64 So. 684 (La. 1913) (oil drilling lease).
182. Kent followed Blackstone's description of employment contracts running year-toyear. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425 (1765); 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 258-59 (2d ed. 1832).
183. Wood's ruminations have been pointed to as a harbinger of the shift to at-will
treatment. HORACE G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT 134 (1877). See Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118, 126-30 (1976).
Twentieth century commentators have established that Wood disingenuously cited authority that did not support his claim. See id. at 126; see also 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE,
supra note 22, § 39 (regretting failure of courts to follow the true contract principles).
184. WOOD, supra note 183 § 134.
185. See Feinman, supra note 183, at 126. See also 1 WILLISTON, 1921 TREATISE, supra
note 22 § 39 (regretting failure of courts to follow true contract principles).
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nineteenth century, this introduced at-will theory had begun to
overtake the field.1 86 As traditional employment relations were
supplanted by more complex alternative arrangements for the distribution of goods and services, the emerging notion of at-will relations migrated into these modem contractual devices. 8' 7 There
was a natural doctrinal tendency for courts to expand at-will
treatment to modern methods of distribution since agency had
always been considered at-will.'88 Courts began to say that, for the
purpose of determining revocability, it was immaterial whether
agency or distributorship was involved because case law on termination could be applied interchangeably. 189
As reliance hardship resulted from at-will treatment of these
new methods of marketing, courts softened the impact of the new
rule by granting relief for the loss of substantial initial investments necessary to conduct exclusive distribution and franchise
agreements. The evolution of this reliance relief began with exclusive sales agreements and licenses, and then during the first
quarter of the twentieth century, theories of recovery evolved to
cover more intricate agency and distributorship agreements. The
equitable solutions granted in exclusive sales transactions near
the turn of the century were prompted when producers canceled
agreements after having induced buyers to accumulate large inventories through promises of exclusive territories. In Saddlery
Hardware Co. v. Hillsboro Mills,9 ° the plaintiff bought plaid blan186. See Raymond v. White, 78 N.W. 469, 471 (Mich. 1899) (accepting that employee
could be terminated at any time); Feinman, supra note 183, at 126-34; 1 WILLISTON, 1921
TREATISE, supra note 22 § 139 (admitting universality of at-will rule). "Permanent" or "for
life" employment interpreted as at-will unilateral undertaking. See 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017 (Samuel Williston & George T. Thompson eds., rev. ed.
1936).
187. See Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F.2d 138, 138-39 (E.D.Pa. 1925); 4 WILLISTON, 1936
TREATISE, supra note 48 § 1027A (stating that under influence of simpler master and servant relations, where it is less easy to raise mutual obligations and detrimental reliance,
sales agencies and distributorships have been found to be at-will).
188. See, e.g., Courier-Journal Co. v. Miller, 50 S.W. 46, 47 (Ky. 1899) (interpreting
agency to sell newspapers to allow discharge "at any time without cause"); Alexander v.
Capitol Paint Co., 111 A. 140, 141-42 (Md. 1920) (saying ordinary brokerage with no time
strictures may be terminated at-will); Buick Motor Co. v. Thompson, 75 S.E. 354, 354-55
(Ga. 1912) (ten day notice for termination).
189. See Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Bobo, 4 F.2d 71, 72 (9" Cir. 1925); Carlson v.
Stone-Ordean-Wells Co., 107 P. 419, 422 (Mont. 1910); 9 WILLISTON, 1936 TREATISE, supra
note 48 § 1017A (stating that for the purpose of determining termination of relations, they
.are essentially the same, and cases of either type are authoritative on this point for the
other"). The notion of revocable agency relations, when ownership of goods did not pass,
had been extended to distributorships and franchises where ownership of producer's goods
did pass.
190. 44 A. 300 (N.H. 1895).
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kets made by the defendant on the understanding that the plaintiff had the exclusive right to sell them in New York City, but the
defendant later revoked before the plaintiff could sell the inventory acquired. The 1895 New Hampshire decision barred the defendant from selling blankets to anyone else in the City until the
plaintiff could sell the blankets purchased in reliance on the promFifteen years later, a Montana
ise of an exclusive territory.'
court applied the "rule announced by the New Hampshire court"
in Saddlery HardwareCo. v. Hillsboro Mills to a buildup of invenThis implied consent to a
tory under similar circumstances.1 92
good faith duty to not revoke until a plaintiffs induced investment
had been recouped would soon be applied by courts and legislatures to distributorship and franchise arrangements, such as
those used in contracts between automobile manufacturers and
dealers.9
The relief given to buyers in exclusive sales agreements was extended to cover substantial reliance harm suffered by at-will distributors. In a 1912 action brought against Buick Motor Co., an
automobile dealer, operating under a ten day cancellation clause,
was terminated and refused delivery of automobiles to fill the
three purchase orders the plaintiff had made the effort to obtain.
The Georgia court ruled that revocation was barred because of the
plaintiffs part performance of a unilateral contract,"' but the relationship could also have been characterized as an at-will relationship that could not be terminated once the plaintiff had incurred
reliance cost and labor. Automobile manufacturers' abuse of their
market power became so egregious that in Erskine v. Chevrolet
191. Saddlery Hardware Co., 44 A. at 301 (allowing concern for reliance harm to outweigh concern over restraint of trade).
192. Carlson v. Stone-Ordean-Wells Co., 107 P. 419, 422 (Mont. 1910); Saddlery Hardware Co., 44 A. at 301. The Montana court said, "Parties must have contemplated that the
defendant company would give to the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to dispose of the
goods which he had on hand" before defendant revoked. Carlson, 107 P. at 422; cf. 1
ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 4 (1761) (William Evan tr. &
ed. 1806) (requiring "concurrence of intention in two parties").
193. See J.R. Watkins v. Rich, 235 N.W. 845, 846 (1931) (When termination of an at-will
'relationship is commercial . . . the option must be exercised in good faith"); Automobile
Dealers Day in Court, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1222 (1956); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802 (gasoline distributors); New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J.
Stat. Ann. 56:10-5, 56:10-7 (West. Supp. 1983); Massachusetts Fair Dealing Act, M.G.L.A.
ch. 93A, 93B (1971).
194. Buick Motor Co. v. Thompson, 75 S.E. 354, 356 (Ga. 1912). The transaction can be
characterized as an at-will contract or, in the alternative, a series of possible unilateral
contracts because the defendant offered to pay the plaintiffthe difference between list and
retail price for orders he obtained. Id.
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Motors Co. a North Carolina court launched into a diatribe against
automobile manufacturers for their unsavory tactics in luring "victimized" dealers into "relying" on the seeming security of "written
contracts," when in fact no protection was afforded by their at-will
contracts. 9 ' Since either party could cancel the written contract
on five days notice, the plaintiff informed Chevrolet's regional
general manager that he would cancel if Chevrolet did not give
assurances that the same would not happen to him. After the
general manager gave oral assurances that the plaintiff would not
be canceled like that, the plaintiff incurred large necessary startup expenses; however, the defendant subsequently canceled anyway.196 The North Carolina court reasoned that it "was solely on
the faith" of the oral assurances that "plaintiff expended large
sums of money" and that consideration was present. 97 This finding of reliance on the manufacturer's promise in the form of distributor's expenditure of necessary start-up costs, over and above
what was need in a revocable agency, became a key factor in binding principals in future decisions. 9 '
Pennsylvania followed a unique alternative route to reach the
same conclusion that the above line of cases arrived at to provide
relief from the justifiable reliance of at-will sales distributors. The
genesis of Pennsylvania's solution was in an 1826 decision on a
specific performance action brought on account of reliance on a
land license.199 The court in Rerick v. Kern noted that a license is
normally revocable by a landowner, but when the plaintiff was
induced to build a commercial mill on the defendant's land, it had

195. Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 117 S.E. 706, 711 (N.C. 1923).
196. Erskine, 117 S.E. at 710. In a parallel 1954 California decision, a court held a producer bound to a one year relationship with the plaintiff on an oral contract of indefinite
duration because the plaintiff relied on assurances of the producer's representative that the
producer was a well meaning company that did not arbitrarily terminate distributors. J.C.
Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F.Supp. 484, 488-493 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
197. Erskine, 117 S.E. at 710. "Stronger or more effective inducement could not have
been held out." Id. at 712. The primary emphasis in rationale was on reliance on oral
modification which assured no arbitrary cancellation, but the court did not preclude the
interpretation that reliance on at-will written contract would have been sufficient. See id.
at 714 (stating that reliance was incurred upon oral assurances and "not necessarily upon
the written contracts").
198. See, e.g., Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F.2d 138, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1925); J.C. Millett Co.
v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F.Supp. 484, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (California law);
Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935, 938-39 (4" Cir. 1955).
199. Rerick v. Kern, 14 S.&R. 267 (Pa. 1826).
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"the effect of turning such a license into an agreement that will be
executed in equity." °0
The reliance protection on a revocable land license in Rerick v.
Kern laid the groundwork in Pennsylvania at the turn of the twentieth century for the unusual step taken in Harris v. Brown"° ' of
extending the real property license precedent to a license to use
intangible personal property. The defendant had purchased the
assets of an insolvent firm, and she acquired a license to use the
former firm's name from her son, a shareholder of the defunct
firm. After the defendant had applied her business acumen and
efforts for four years to make a success of her new business, her
son brought an action to bar her use of the trade name. The trial
court in Harrisv. Brown applied the general rule that a license to
use a plaintiffs intangible personal property was revocable, but on
appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that it "would be
inequitable and unjust" to allow revocation of the license after a
licensee acted upon a licensor's consent and generated commercial
value in the trade name.0 2
The protection of the licensee's reliance interest in Rerick v.
Kern was advanced by Harris v. Brown, and that protection was
further extended in Pennsylvania to exclusive distributorship relationships in 1925 in Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley. °3 In Bassick, the
plaintiff argued that the general rule provided for the revocability
of both the agency relationship and the attendant license of the
plaintiffs trade name,20 4 but the court retorted that more was involved in the distributorship relationship than a revocable agency
and license because the defendant was obliged to incur substantial
200. Rerick, 14 S.&R. at 272. Accord LeFevre v. LeFevre, 4 S.&R. 241, 244-45 (Pa.
1818). Wynn v. Garland cited Rerick v. Kern as authority in a similar case of reliance on a
license which, if revoked, would have caused irreparable damage. Wynn v. Garland, 19
Ark. 23, 33-34, 38 (1857) (stating licensor cannot revoke after licensee "reposed . .
.confidence" in the "good faith" of licensor). See Roscoe Pound, Considerationin Equity in
WIGMORE CELEBRATION LEGAL ESSAYS 435, 443 (Albert Kocourek ed. 1919) [hereinafter
Pound, Consideration in Equity] (observing that courts will prevent an "unconscionable
revocation" in the case of reliance by treating a license as an easement).
201. 51 A. 586 (Pa. 1902).
202. Harris, 51 A. at 587 (citingRerick v. Kern as authority while closely paraphrasing
that decision). See also Rerick v. Kern, 14 S.&R. 267, 271(Pa. 1826) (opining that it would
be "against all conscience to annul" such a grant after the grantee's expenditures were
observed by the grantor). Cf. Pound, Consideration in Equity, supra note 200 at 443 (explaining equity would treat a license as an easement to prevent 'unconscionable revocat1on").
203. 9 F.2d 138 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
204. Bassick Mfg. Co., 9 F.2d at 139. (Plaintiffs cause of action was to restrain defendant from using plaintiffs trade name and trademark.). Id.
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expenditures to maintain a store, employ agents, and build up his
business in order to get the distributorship off the ground.2"5 The
court said, "The case comes clearly within the rule laid down by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Harris v. Brown .... ,,206
The distributorship relationship of course required more complex
initial efforts by the distributor than was the case for the licensee
in Harris v. Brown. Thus, in three cases decided under Pennsylvania law during the span of a century, Pennsylvania courts extended the reliance relief granted in 1826 to bar revocation of a
land license to a license of a trade name in 1902 and then on to a
sales distributorship in 1925.
In the following year, Reporter Williston's report to A.L.I. portrayed Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley as an anomalous expansion of
precedents that had earlier granted specific performance on land
gifts relied upon by possession and improvements. 7 Bassick Mfg.
Co. v. Riley has been occasionally cited by other courts,2 8 though
no jurisdiction has evolved along the same path as Pennsylvania
in drawing inspiration for equitable treatment of at-will agreements from land licenses. The route to rationalizing reliance recovery for distributors in other jurisdictions like North Carolina
has been more main stream in remaining within the confines of
contract theory at law and in equity. Still, the crux of the reasoning employed to reach the conclusion in the North Carolina decision, Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., was parallel to that reached
under Pennsylvania law in Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley and Harrisv.
Brown. These three courts saw more involved in the relationships
than merely an agency or a license, and so each court refused to
permit the manufacturer to revoke the distributorship with impunity because each party anticipated that the distributor's enjoyment of profits would necessarily be preceded by substantial startup costs and labor.20 9

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. A.L.I. COMMENTARIES 1926, supra note 22, at 15.
208. See, e.g., Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1955) (saying
that under South Carolina law, relationship not revocable since reliance entailed more than
simply selling principal's goods); Boulevard Airport, Inc. v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft
Corp., 85 F. Supp. 876, 879 (Dist. Ct. Pa. 1949); Meadow v. Radio Industries, Inc., 222 F.2d
347, 349 (7th Cir. 1955).
209. Harris v. Brown, 51 A. at 587; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 117 S.E. 706, 71011 (N.C. 1923); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F.2d at 138; accord J.C. Millett Co. v. Park &
Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 493 (N.D.Cal. 1954); Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks,
227 F.2d 935, 937-39 (4th Cir.1955).
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Reliance on ContractModifications

For centuries, courts have refused to enforce contract modifications to reduce or increase a contract obligation because of the fear
of coercion and the absence of fresh consideration to support a
modification promise. 2" This bargain corollary to the doctrine of
consideration, known today as the preexisting duty rule, appeared
in the sixteenth century in the wake of the emergence of the consideration test for enforcement of contractors' promises that
looked to future performance. Erosion of this broad prohibition on
contract modifications occurred during the nineteenth century as
American courts began to provide relief from hardship caused by
promisees' reliance on modification promises. This hardship relief
would prove to be a harbinger of modern reforms of the preexisting duty rule grounded upon consent alone.211
(a)

Reduction in Contract Obligation

The Rule in Pinnel's Case, enunciated in 1602, is the precedent
traditionally invoked to deny a contract modification to reduce an
amount owed. 2 2 The rule took on renewed vitality when in 1884
when the House of Lords repulsed a serious challenge to the rule
in the influential decision of Foakes v. Beer, though Lord Blackburn came close to dissenting since a creditor might find benefit in
the bird-in-the-hand of part payment. 213 This decision lent more
importance to the rule by consolidating both decreases and in210. See Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (1602) (refusing attempted reduction of payment due because modification to pay 10 pounds was no "satisfaction for the 20 pounds");
Stilk v. Myrick, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809) (refusing attempted increase in compensation
because employees had not taken on any new duties).
211. See, e.g., Clayton v. Clark, 21 So. 565, 567-68 (Miss. 1896); Frye v. Hubbell, 68 A.
325, 334 (N.H. 1907); Moore v. Williamson, 104 So. 645, 646-47 (Ala. 1925); Rye v. Phillips,
282 N.W. 459, 460 (Minn. 1938); U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1952).
212. Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (1602) (refusing debt action since part payment did
not discharge obligation); cf. Richards v. Bartlet, 74 Eng. Rep. 17 (1584) (ruling in assumpsit action that no new profit to plaintiff nor charge to defendant by modification). Foakes v.
Beer later presumed that Pinnell's Case also barred attempted increases in contract obligations and thereby pointed to Pinnell's Case as the source of the preexisting duty rule for
both decreases and increases in contract obligations. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 609,
615 (H.L. 1884); see DAWSON, GIFTS, supra note 144, at 210(stating that Pinnel's accord
rule spread to increases in obligations as well).
213. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 622 (H.L. 1884). Cf. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 487-88
(1950) (arguing it would not be unjust to demand the original rental price from a tenant
who is allowed to pay less than original agreement); but cf. Jaffray v. Greenbaum, 20 N.W.
775, 778-79 (Ia. 1884) (finding consideration in benefit to landlord in keeping tenant afloat
to make the reduced rental payments).
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creases in contract obligations under what became known as the
"preexisting duty rule."214 While the English court in Pinnel's
Case did not find it relevant that the debtor had relied on the
modification agreement and paid the reduced amount, an Illinois
court held in 1846 that a debtor's reliance on a time extension, by
not rushing to make the original deadline, was consideration for
the extension.21 Some late nineteenth century American decisions
held that once a debtor relied on the modification promise by full
payment of the reduced amount, the creditor was barred from recovery of the remainder of the original obligation.216 In enforcing a
reduction of rent owed, a New York court said, "Both parties acted
under this arrangement, and it was executed and carried into effect."2"7 Another New York court concluded that Pinnel's Case did
2 8 despite
not apply to a modification agreement "fully executed,""
the fact the agreed part payment had also been made in Pinnel's
Case. Some nineteenth century courts of law and equity rejected
Pinnel's preservation of the bargain when reliance facts indicated
that near tortious harm had been induced.
214. The law lords indiscriminately lumped together precedents involving increases in
contract obligations under the Stilk v. Myrick strand and decreases in contract obligations
under Pinnel's Case.
215. Wadsworth v. Thompson, 8 Ill. 423, 431 (1846). Modern formalist English common
law contract permits promissory estoppel to apply as a defensive tool to enforce reduction of
a contractual obligation under the High Trees decision. Justiable reliance has not been
permitted, however, to create a new cause of action, with the exception in property law of
the limited reach of proprietary estoppel. See Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High
Trees House Ltd., 1 K.B. 130 (1947); Crabb v. Arun District Council, Ch. 179, 187-88, 195
(1976) (proprietary estoppel to avert a fraud in equity).
216. See, e.g., Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N.Y. 580, 585 (1879); McKenzie v. Harrison, 24 N.E.
458, 459-60 (N.Y. 1890). The reliance of creditors was a basis for enforcing assignments for
the benefit of creditors and of creditors' compositions. See also Taylor v. Ewing, 132 P.
1009 (Wash. 1913) (binding debtor to agreement to assign on account of reliance of 38 of 40
creditors); Butler v. Rhodes, 170 Eng. Rep. 341 (1794) (barring one creditor from withdrawing from composition after other creditors committed); Bartlett v. Woodsworth Co., 41 A.
264 (N.H. 1898) (creditors' composition).
217. Nicoll, 78 N.Y. at 585. Since the parties fully performed the modified agreement as
well, it would have been useful to point out that the proprietary logic in the debt action
Pinnel's Case was inappropriate to the promise-based action of assumpsit See AMES, supra
note 17, at 329; see also STOLJAR, supra note 2, at 120-21.
218. McKenzie, 24 N.E. at 460 (making remarkable claim that executed gift had been
made, thereby taking it out of contract rule stated by Coke in Pinnel's Case and the law
lords in Foakes v. Beer). This executed gift logic exhibited a reticence to make a frontal
reliance-based assault against the recently-announced decision in Foakes v. Beer; nonetheless, it entailed disguised reliance hardship relief in the absence of clear donative intent.
By contrast, the explanation of the court in Nicoll v.Burke was doctrinally closer to the
mark in reasoning that the rent reduction agreement was binding because "defendant
occupied the premises and the plaintiffs received the rent, according to the altered terms of
the contract." Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N.Y. at 585.

Fall 2004

Binding Gratuitous Promises

The need for a reduction in the amount due under the contract
was occasionally triggered by losses generated by an unanticipated change in circumstances in the new industrial economy.
While unanticipated circumstances alone were insufficient to justify enforcement of a modification during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century,219 a debtor's reliance on the modification by

continuation of what was otherwise a financially untenable project
sometimes made the difference. In Ten Eyck v. Sleeper,"' a lessee
under a long-term lease of a hotel building became unable to pay
the rent due to a general depression in the economy in 1893, and
so the lessee informed the lessor that he would have to vacate. In
order to induce the lessee to continue occupancy, the lessor offered
him a rent reduction, which the lessee accepted and paid for the
next sixteen months. The Minnesota court noted that mere inability to pay rent would not be a reason to find consideration, but
that it was a different matter when an unforeseen depression precipitated a reduction agreement that was subsequently performed. 21 The unforeseen circumstances and the subsequent reli-

ance assuaged any concern over coerced modifications, and they
also established consideration.222 Other jurisdictions sometimes
simply would find consideration for a reduction agreement on facts
of changed circumstances and a subsequent reliance without development of how this combination of facts supplied a good reason
for enforcement.2
(b) Increase in Contract Obligation
A modification to increase the contract compensation owed fell
under the Stilk v. Myrick2

1

strain of the preexisting duty rule.

219. Today, a modification may be binding, in the absence of reliance, if made "in view of
See
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981).
220. 67 N.W. 1026 (Minn. 1896) (involving dispute between landlord and other creditors
of insolvent lessee).
221. Ten Eyck, 67 N.W. at 1027-028 (stating that modification was binding 'especially as
it has been executed"). This case is similar to modern English decision High Trees. See
Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd, 1 KB. 130 (1947).
222. Ten Eyck, 67 N.W. at 1027-028. An added prong of the rationale was grounded
upon the benefit that the lessee's reliance provided to the lessor in form of continuing occupancy and some flow of rental income. Id. (citing Jaffray, 20 N.W. at 775, and Raymond v.
Krauskopf, 54 N.W. 432, 433 (Ia. 1893)).
223. See, e.g., Raymond, 54 N.W. at 433 (noting that severe storm's damage to crops
prompted agreement to halve the crops that a farmer was required to deliver to his landlord).
224. 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809).
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This 1809 English decision ruled unenforceable a sea captain's
promise to increase the wages of seamen who agreed to work
short-handed after other seamen deserted in a foreign port. The
English court concluded that consideration was lacking, but concern about coercion seemed to be a subtext.22 The leading nineteenth century American precedent to depart from Stilk v. Myrick
22
The plaintiff in Munwas the 1830 decision Munroe v. Perkins.
roe v. Perkins expressed concern to the defendant about the plaintiffs ability to continue with construction of a hotel for the defendant because of losses, and the defendant assured him that he
would not lose on the deal if he completed the project. In the end,
the Massachusetts court employed logic from New York and Pennsylvania decisions, rendered in 1817 and 1818 respectively, to
support recovery for completion of the hotel at a higher modified
2 27 a
price. In the 1817 New York decision, Lattimore v. Harsen,
contractor indicated that he would have to abandon his contract to
open a cart way for the City of New York; subsequently, the contractor completed the work after the defendant agreed to pay more
if he would complete construction. The New York court declared
that the plaintiff had the right to elect to breach the contract and
incur damages, but the modification became binding when the defendant released the plaintiff from the first contract on the condition that the modified arrangement was performed. 2 1 In the 1818
Pennsylvania decision, Le Fevre v. Le Fevre,229 the location of an
225. Stilk, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1169 (saying seamen's original duty was to work shorthanded if there were desertions); cf Harris v. Watson, 170 Eng. Rep. 94, (1791) (refusing
seaman extra wages promised under coercion while their ship was in danger on policy
grounds).
226. 26 Mass. 298 (1830).
227. 14 Johns. 330 (N.Y. 1817).
228. Lattimore, 14 Johns. at 331 (ruling consideration supported second contract); Munroe v. Perkins, 26 Mass. 303, 303-04 (1830) (finding a waiver of original contract); cf Harris
v. Carter, 118 Eng. Rep. 1251, 1252 (1854) (stating dictum that if a first contract had been
discharged and a new contract had been made to pay higher wages to seamen because of
desertions, then consideration would have been present). The Holmesian paradox of a right
to breach a contract and pay damages, derived from Lattimore v. Harsen, was roundly
criticized by other commentators who saw an obligation in law to perform a contract and
only secondarily to pay damages upon breach. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means
a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, -- and nothing else."); but cf.
Willard Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract, 16 MICH. L. REV. 106, 107-09 (1917)
(stressing that duty to perform since time of Bracton); 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 80 (Pollock chided Holmes for his right-to-breach view on grounds of morality
and a promisee's reasonable expectations.); IA CORBIN, supra note 144, § 182 (depicting
primary duty to perform contract).
229. 4 S.&R. 241 (Pa. 1818) (action was trespass vi et armis for defendant cutting the
water pipe).
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easement, granted by deed, to run a water pipe across the defendant's land was altered at the defendant's oral request. However,
the defendant later cut the pipe and raised a statute of frauds defense against enforcement of the modified oral license. The court
held the modified agreement binding because it would be a "fraud"
for the defendant to revoke the license after the defendant induced
the plaintiff to rely by expenditures and effort to move the water
line. 230 The court drew on a strain of land cases in which equity
barred a statute of frauds defense and granted specific performance on account of justifiable reliance without any reference to the
doctrine of consideration. 3 ' If the reliance element was emphasized solely to prevent the fraud of raising a statute of frauds defense, equitable estoppel would have been at play, but since the
reliance also effectively supplanted the need to show consideration
to support the modification promise, promissory estoppel was present as well.232
The formula Munroe v. Perkins derived from these two precedents was that a contract modification became binding if a party
elected to breach a losing contract and thereafter the victim
agreed to waive the breach and pay more compensation in order to
induce completion of performance. 233 From Lattimore v. Harsen
came the notions of right-to-breach and waiver, without emphasis
on the subsequent reliance present in its facts, 234 and from Le
Fevre v. Le Fevre came the emphasis on induced justifiable reliance.235 Thereafter, American courts cited Munroe v. Perkins and
occasionally Lattimore v. Harsen, both contracts cases, but courts
rarely cited the reliance-based statute of frauds license decision Le
230. Le Fevre, 4 S.&R. at 244 (concluding that the plaintiff had partly performed "by
payment of money, taking possession and making valuable improvements, the conscience of
the other is bound to carry it into execution").
231. See, e.g., Rerick v. Kern, 14 S.&R. 267, 271-72 (Pa. 1826) (land license); Wynn v.
Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 34-36 (1857) (land license); Butcher v. Staplely, 23 Eng. Rep. 524, 525
(1685) (land sale); see also Bright v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97 (1866) (stating that taking possession
of land was not enough to take it outside statute of frauds but improvements made it a
"promise resting upon a valuable consideration"). In Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, plaintiffs lawyer
and the court paraphrased Phillipps' comment that evidence of oral modification may be
admitted to vary a written agreement "provided those variations have been acted upon."
SAMUEL M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 450 (2d ed. 1815); Le Fevrev, 4
S.&R. at 242, 245.
232. Giving reliance relief to avert fraud was consistent with sixteenth century actions
permitted at common law in assumpsit for deceit and in church courts under fidei laesio.
233. 26 Mass. 298, 305 (1830). The court emphasized that the promisee was induced to
return to work and in fact completed performance. Id. at 303, 305.
234. 14 Johns. 330, 331(N.Y. 1817).
235. 4 S.&R. 241, 244-45 (Pa. 1818).
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Fevre v. Le Fevre, with the unfortunate increased risk of coercion
when the reliance factor was not required in some later cases.236
Through the middle of the nineteenth century, citations to Munroe
v. Perkins and Lattimore v. Harsen emphasized reliance on the
substituted modification agreement. 37 Some jurisdictions emphasized the reliance element when they cited Munroe and Lattimore
through the rest of the century.238 However, other decisions emphasized the Lattimore prong of the Munroe rationale as a means
to assert that a modification could be supported by consideration,
in the absence of reliance, if there was a rescission of the original
contract and a substitution of a new contract. And when such
cases happened to include reliance facts, they were treated as superfluous." 9
The influential 1895 Minnesota decision King v. Duluth M. & N.
Ry. Co.24 raised concerns about the potential for coercion in case
law applications of Munroe v. Perkins that enforced modifications
solely because of rescission and substitution, irrespective of reli-

236. The concern about coercion embedded in the preexisting duty rule was assuaged in
Munroe v. Perkins by a contractor's election to breach without any demand for higher compensation, followed by the owner's voluntary offer to pay more and the contractor's subsequent reliance upon the promise to pay more.
237. In Coyner v. Lynde, a railway agreed to pay more to induce contractor to return to a
losing contract. The court cited Munroe and Lattimore and emphasized that defendant
"relying on this promise.., they completed said work." Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282, 285
(1858). Coyner was widely cited during the remainder of the century. In Meech v. City of
Buffalo, defendant's counsel cited Lattimore and Munroe, and the court paraphrased the
latter, without citation, in emphasizing the relevance of the reliance. Meech v. City of
Buffalo, 29 N.Y. 198, 211, 213-14. By the Meech court's reading of Munroe v. Perkins in
conflating the reliance element in Le Fevre together with the elective right-to-breach in
Lattimore, the New York court effectively compromised Lattimore's controversial theory.
Cf. FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 202 n. (3d ed. 1887) (observing that
Munroe also rejected that elective right-to-breach in Lattimore could stand alone).
238. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Robertson, 46 N.E. 925, 926-28 (Ind. 1897) (saying "much
stress is properly laid upon ... subsequent conduct of the parties. It would seem that it
would be a reproach to the law if any of its rules were so inflexible" as to strictly apply
preexisting duty rule here); Evans v. Oregon & W.R. Co., 108 P. 1095, 1096 (Wash. 1910)
(stating that enforcement supported freedom of contractors to modify their relationship).
Restatment drafters would recognize this reliance basis for a binding contract modification.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(c) (1981).
239. See, e.g., Bryant v. Lord, 19 Minn. 396, 404 (1872) (stating that if the defendant
refused to proceed unless a modification granted, then the substituted agreement would be
on valid consideration); Rogers v. Rogers, 1 N.E. 122, 122 (Mass. 1885) ("The parties could
clearly substitute for it a new contract, which would determine their rights and liabilities
after the new contract was made, and this would operate as a waiver or discharge of the
first contract."); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, 131 N.E. 887, 888-90 (N.Y. 1921) (citing
Lattimore v. Harsen that rescission and substitution is good, and mutual promises are
consideration).
240. 63 N.W. 1105 (Minn. 1895).
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ance.2 4' The cases criticized were decisions that, like Lattimore v.

Harsen earlier, did not articulate the need for reliance in their
rationales even when reliance was present in the facts.142 These

criticisms were reinforced by doctrinal objections leveled against
the right-to-breach theory enunciated in Lattimore and Munroe
and supported by Holmes.243 The court in King v. Duluth Ry. concluded that an unanticipated change in circumstances assuaged
concern over coercion and permitted enforcement of a modification
under that exception to the preexisting duty rule.44
Early cases of contract modifications made because of unanticipated changes in circumstances cited the landmark modification
precedent Munroe v. Perkins as well, though no changed circum245 One of the earliest
stances were present in Munroe v. Perkins.
changed circumstances cases appeared in the 1864 New York decision Meech v. City of Buffalo, where a contractor unexpectedly
hit quicksand while constructing a sewer for the city, and the city
agreed to pay more for completion of the work.2 4

Counsel for the

contractor, citing both Munroe and Lattimore, argued that when a
contract became a losing proposition due to an unforeseen obstacle, the defendant could waive the breach action and agree to a
fair adjustment.2

47

The New York court cited no precedent but ob-

viously drew from Munroe and Lattimore in referring to the contractor's election to breach and the city's subsequent promise of
increased compensation, which thereby induced completion of the

241. King, 63 N.W. at 1106 (seeing coercion in taking "unjustifiable advantage of the
necessities of the other party"). The court said the breachor of the first contract "cannot lay
the foundation of an estoppel by his own wrong." Id. at 1107. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. (b) (1981) (rejecting fiction of rescission and substitution
because modified contract might be "unfair and inequitable").
242. See, e.g., Bryant, 19 Minn. at 346; Rogers v. Rogers, 1 N.E. 122, 122 (Mass. 1885).
243. Pollock opposed Holmes' callous views that justifiable reliance could not be a
ground for consideration and that a contractor had an elective right to breach and pay
contract damages. See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 294-96; Holmes, supra note 228, at 462;
cf. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 14, at 80; FREDERICK POLLOCK PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT 1 (8" ed. 1911); see also Willard Barbour, The "Right"to Break a Contract, 16
MICH L. REV. 106, 107-09 (1917); 1A CORBIN, supra note 144, § 182.
244. King, 63 N.W. at 1106-07; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89a
(1981).
245. The fact that a contract turned out to be a losing deal for one of the parties did not
of itself mean there were unanticipated circumstances to justify a modification. See King,
63 N.W. at 1107.
246. Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y. 198 (1864); cf. Osborne v. Reilly, 9 A. 209, 216
(N.J. 1887) (holding modification binding on account of reliance and changed circumstances).
247. Meech, 29 N.Y. at 218.
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sewer."' The court concluded that coercion was unlikely since the
contractor was performing in "good faith" when he unexpectedly
encountered quicksand.2 49 A Minnesota court made a similar point
2 50 when it noted the criticism of the risk
in Michaud v. MacGregor,
of coercion in the use of the rescission and substitution aspect of
Munroe v. Perkins, but said a case was different when higher costs
were caused by the unexpected circumstances of rock obstructions
in the ground.251
While Meech v. City of Buffalo and Michaud v. MacGregor included the dual grounds of reliance and unanticipated circumstances,2 2 the King v. Duluth Ry. decision justified enforcement of
the modification to increase compensation solely upon unanticiThe opinion in King v. Duluth Ry. cited
pated circumstances.'
both Meech and Michaud with approval, since these cases included in their facts the types of unforeseen difficulties that qualified for an exception to the general rule. 254 But the King v. Duluth
Ry. court swam against main stream legal development by opposing enforcement of a contract modification relied upon when no
new burden was thrust upon the relying party. 5 Under this approach, a prospective loss on a contract was a risk to be borne
unless a substantial change in circumstances placed an additional
burden on the party not contemplated by the parties when the
contract was made. The consensual theory supplied the basis for
enforcement of a modification made due to a change not contem248. Id. at 213-14 (telling assessed property owners who brought action that it was
"eminently just" for city to promise to pay more).
249. Id. at 213.
250. 63 N.W. 479 (Minn. 1895).
251. Michaud, 63 N.W. at 480-81 (commenting that added costs to remove rocks in reliance on modification "equitably estops him from insisting on" the original terms).
252. Accord Osborne v. O'Reilly, 9 A. 209, 216 (N.J. 1887) (enforcing modification because of changed circumstances and reliance).
253. King v. Duluth M.&R. Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105, 1107 (Minn. 1895). A generation
earlier Bishop v. Busse enforced a modification because of unexpected increases in materials in rebuilding a house damaged by the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. Bishop v. Busse, 69
111. 403, 407 (1873). See also Linz v. Schuck, 67 A. 286, 288 (Md. 1907) (holding modification binding because "the difficulties were substantial, unforeseen and not in the contemplation of the parties when the original contract was made").
254. King, 63 N.W. at 1107. Qualifying changed circumstances are not uncommonly
brought on to a degree by the fault of the defendant. See id. at 1108 (railway changing
location of railway line and railway's defaults); Osborne, 9 A. at 215 (excavator "misled" by
owner's representations regarding nature of stone); United Steel Co. v. Casey, 262 F. 889,
893 (6 Cir. 1920) (delays and hindrances of steel company).
255. Of course when there were changed circumstances, an additional performance
burden would be present. The exchange of extra work done in reliance on the promise of
additional payment was supported by consideration. See King, 63 N.W. at 1107.
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plated, and the unforeseen circumstances rebutted any inference
of coercion.256 Perhaps the King v. Duluth Ry. court's resistance to
reliance relief, in the absence of changed circumstances, can be
attributed to the fact that the reliance element was not always
clearly separated from the faulty rescission and substitution theory in cases that focused on the Lattimore v. Harsen aspect of the
rationale in Munroe v. Perkins.257 The viewpoint expressed in King
v. Duluth Ry. did not end the availability of the pure reliance exception, but it did contribute to the decline in the fictional rescission and substitution exception to the preexisting duty rule."' The
reliance prong of the opinion in Munroe v. Perkins and the unanticipated circumstances ground in King v. Duluth Ry. comprise the
primary justifications at common law for enforcement of modifications which increase contractual obligations for subject matter
other than goods to this day.259
III. DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION PRINCIPLE
The genesis in Western legal thought of the idea of a moral obligation principle, and of restitution as well, resides in the Roman
law doctrine of negotiorum gestio, the notion that recompense
ought to be given for unsolicited good neighborly acts."s In contrast to civil law countries, Roman law was ignored as a source for
growth in the common law until Mansfield and his disciples sat on
the King's Bench.26' Mansfield's decisions based upon moral obligation, sometimes called moral consideration, covered a wide variety of contexts including waiver of bankruptcy, a widow's ratification after coverture, and a father's promise to pay for his illegiti-

256. Id. (tolerating waiver and substitution explanation when changed circumstances).
257. E.g., Bryant, 19 Minn. at 404; Rogers, 1 N.E. at 122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 279 cmt. c (1981) (substituted contract binding if supported by consideration).
258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b (1981) (rejecting fiction of
rescission and substitution).
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a), (b) (1981).
260. Cf. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 227-29 (1962); JOHN P.
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

55-60 (1951)

[hereinafter

DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT]. Roman negotiorum gestio was an obligation implied inlaw in the absence of a subsequent promise.
261. See id. at 55-64, 129, 139-40. Mansfield. C.J.'s broad support for moral obligation
would have accommodated negotiorum gestio under his decisions in the allied fields of
quasi contract and moral obligation, e.g., Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760);
Atkins v. Hill, 98 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1090 (1775); Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035,
1038 (per Wimot, J.).
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mate child's maintenance.262 Mansfield also drew upon prior
common law decisions that enforced promises on moral obligations, including the redoubtable Chief Justice Holt's waiver and
ratification precedents.263 Beyond the strand of moral obligation
introduced by Holt, earlier moral obligation notions were scattered
through sixteenth and seventeenth century case reports, primarily
for cases of necessaries provided to dependents.2" Nevertheless, a
conservative common law judicial reaction set in during the second quarter of the nineteenth century to Mansfield's absorption of
civilian and equitable ideas into the common law. This atavism
was justified under the logic of a doctrinaire 1802 reporters' note
to Wennall v. Adney," 5 which had been ignored by judges but not
commentators; the note criticized perceived doctrinal inconsistencies and paid little heed to the justice being dispensed. The goal of
traditional judicial thinkers in both countries was to turn the
clock back on the common law, along the lines suggested in
Bosanquet and Puller's 1802 reporters' note, by demolishing most
of what had been accomplished to further the just results made
possible by the moral obligation principle over the preceding three
hundred years, aside from Holt's waiver and ratification precedents.266
262. See Trueman v. Fenton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (1777); Goodright ex dim. Elizabeth
Carter v. Straphan, 98 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1774); Scott v. Nelson (1763) reported in Wennall v.
Adney, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 138n. (1802); see also Atkins v. Hill, 98 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1775);
Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782); Atkins v. Banwell, 102 Eng. Rep. 463
(1767).
263. See Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (K.B. 1697) (adult ratification); Heylings v.
Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157 (1699) (waiver of statute of limitations).
264. See, e.g., Style v. Smith, 74 Eng. Rep. 401 (1588) (promise to pay for medical care
given son); Befich v. Coggill, 81 Eng. Rep. 1219 (1628) (promise to pay for burial of son
overseas); Church v. Church, 73 Eng. Rep. 608 n.b (1656) (burial of child); Anonymous., 89
Eng. Rep. 879 (1682) (promise to pay for maintenance of promisor's illegitimate child).
265. Wennall v. Adney, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 n.a (1802) (note of case reporters Bosanquet and Puller).
266. Id. at 140 n.a; Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (1697) (adult ratification); Heylings v. Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157 (1699) (statute of limitations waiver). Holt cited no
precedent in his terse opinion in Ball v. Hesketh, but there were precursors. Two such
cases were added as notes to Hunt v. Bate. The first, Burton's Case, Mich. 28 Eliz. (1586),
ruled that adult defendant's promise to a joint obligor on a debt incurred during defendant's minority was binding: "[A]ssumpsit ... lies, because it was a good consideration,"
and, Whitepool's Case, 1 Leon. 113 (1589), enforced an adult's promise on a debt incurred in
infancy. Hunt v. Bate, 73 Eng. Rep. 605, 607-08 n. (1568); see also JOHN H. BAKER & S.F.C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH HISTORY 499-500 (1986). Heylings v. Hastings, on the other
hand, presented an issue of first impression, and so Holt, C.J. "[p]ut this case to all the
Judges of England ... assembled at Serjeant's Inn; and that this conditional promise had
brought the case out of the Statute of Limitations, and that a general indebitatus assumpsit might be well maintained, because the defendant has waved (sic) the benefit of the statute." Heylings, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1179.
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Courts Unmoved by Early Opposition to Moral Obligation

The Wennall v. Adney reporters' note was an attempt to rationalize away the scant, but long-running, moral obligation precedents with the argument that the promises in those cases somehow must have been grounded upon prior legal obligations, just as
was supposedly the case with Holt's waiver and ratification
cases.67 The reporters employed 1731 dictum in Hayes v. Warren
to indicate that a promise could not be binding in the absence of
bargain evidenced by an expressed or an implied previous request
for the plaintiffs action.268 The court in Hayes v. Warren had
speculated that if the default judgment under review had instead
gone to jury verdict, then perhaps a previous request could have
been implied from the facts.269 This dictum gave the Wennall reporters a means to effectively claim that all contracts must meet
the sixteenth century previous request bargain model announced
in the past consideration precedent Hunt v. Bate."' For some
commentators and judges, the Hayes v. Warren dictum laid out a
doctrinal means to prevail on moral obligation promises by pleading how, with more information, a requisite previous request
might be implied to overcome the objection of lack of a bargain. 7 '
Still, it constituted a caving in to the claim that only bargain
promises were binding.2 72 The King's Bench under Mansfield
would roundly criticize the suggestion that the Hayes dictum could
be said to establish that bargain was the exclusive test for promissory relief,27 and no court employed the idea in Hayes through the
remainder of the eighteenth century.
267. Wennall v. Adney, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 140 n.a (1802); Trueman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232
(1777) (bankruptcy waiver); Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (adult ratification); Heylings
v. Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157 (1699) (statute of limitations waiver). The Wennall reporters were disingenuous in claiming that a prior legal obligation was created when the minor
had originally entered into the agreement.
268. Hayes v. Warren, 93 Eng. Rep. 950 (1731).
269. Id.
270. 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (1568) (ruling plaintiff could not recover for benefit provided to
defendant since defendant did not request plaintiff to act).
271. See Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. (N.Y.) 583, 585 (N.Y. 1804) (dictum); Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 243, 244 (1813). Metcalf would later encourage pleaders to follow
Sjt. Williams' idea of using the implied previous request fiction as a means of avoiding the
lack of bargain defense. METCALF, supra note 47, at 200; Osborne v. Rogers, 1 Wins.
Saund. 264 n.1, 85 Eng. Rep. 318, 319 n.1 (1680) (1798).
272. Cf. TEEVEN, PRIOR OBLIGATIONS, supra note 40, at 3, 106-07 (stating that the focused academic debate over prior obligations in the nineteenth century contributed to
emergence of exclusive bargain consideration test).
273. In the controversial decision Pillans v. Van Mierop, Wimot, J. derided Hayes v.
Warren as "strange and absurd" because the previous request's "[s]trictness has been re-
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The Wennall note was ignored by English and American judges
during the subsequent generation, and commentators on the law
became fixated upon it. In the first edition of Selwyn's treatise,
published six years after the note, Selwyn wrote that the "learned
reporters"of the Wennall note had explained "[wihat must be understood by that term" moral obligation. 7 4 In reaction to a 1767
moral obligation decision of Mansfield,275 Selwyn marginalized the
decision by saying: "I cannot forbear transcribing a part of the ingenious remarks" on that case of the Wennall reporters in observing that there appeared to be a prior legal obligation in support of
the subsequent promise. 76 In Selwyn's sixth edition in 1824, he
admitted that the moral obligation principle had been applied
subsequent to his first edition in the well known Lee v. Muggeridge,27 a decision which enforced a widow's ratification of her
contract made earlier under coverture; he then neutralized that
decision by placing his comment immediately below it, which was
supportive of the bargain-based dictum in Hayes v. Warren.
Selwyn did not acknowledge that English courts had ignored the
Wennall note and had instead liberally applied the moral obligaof cases during the first quarter of the
in
tion principle
271
J a string
ninetenth
In the United States, New York case renineteenth century.
porters Caine and Johnson quickly fell in line with English commentators, despite the leanings of New York judges. Two years
after the Wennall note, Caine's doctrinaire note to Livingston v.
Rogers cited the "very able note" in Wennall v. Adney and declared
that it was "very much in doubt" and "very questionable whether,
on a moral obligation, a request or consideration can be implied."28"
Johnson wrote in an 1819 note to Edwards v. Davis that the Wenlaxed; as, for instance, burying a son, or curing a son, the considerations were both past,
and yet holden good." He added: "It has been melting down into common sense, of late
times." Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1039 (1765). Pillans was discredited in
England thirteen years later. Rann v. Hughes, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n. (H.L. 1778). Nevertheless, Pillans was cited occasionally in nineteenth century American cases.
274. 1 WILLIAM SELWYN, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF NISI PRIUS 41 (1808) [hereinafter SELWYN, 1808 ABRIDGMENT].
275. Atkins, 102 Eng. Rep. at 463.
276. 1 SELWYN, 1808 ABRIDGMENT, supra note 274, at 50 n.11; REPORTERS' NOTE to
Wennall, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 139 n.a.
277. 128 Eng. Rep. 599 (1813).
th
278. 1 WILLIAM SELWYN, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF NISi PRIUS 55-56 (6 ed.
1824).
279. E.g., Cooper v. Martin, 102 Eng. Rep. 759 (1803); Barnes v. Hedley, 127 Eng. Rep.
1047 (1809); Lee v. Muggeridge, 128 Eng. Rep. 599 (1813); Wing v. Mill, 106 Eng. Rep. 39
(1817).
280. Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. (N.Y.) 583, 586 n (1804).
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nall note was absolutely correct that a subsequent promise could
not be binding unless a prior legal obligation had existed.28' Johnson added that a benefit had to flow to the promisor. 2 ' This last
idea would be adopted by the Restatement drafters in 1981.283
Case report annotators performed a role analogous to later treatise writers and Restatement drafters in their encouragement of
consistent doctrinal purity.
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of annotators and treatise
writers for the bargain logic of the Wennall note, English courts
extended the moral obligation principle during the half century
following Mansfield's retirement in 1788. English common law
judges extended the line of moral obligation precedents in a string
of decisions. In the 1803 case of Cooper v. Martin,2"4 an adult stepchild's promise to pay his stepfather for maintenance provided
during his infancy was found binding; Chief Justice Ellenborough
employed the implied request fiction raised in Hayes v. Warren
and perfected as a pleading technique in Serjeant Williams' 1798
case note.285 Then in 1809 and 1813, the court enforced subsequent promises on void contracts. In Barnes v. Hedley,286 a formerly usurious contract was corrected by a second agreement.
The subsequent promise was enforced because a court of chancery
would enforce it. 287 In the 1813 case of Lee v. Muggeridge,211 the
court applied a precedent on point in which Mansfield had enforced a widow's subsequent promise to perform a contract made
earlier under the disability of coverture.2 '9 These decisions on void
promises were of the genre of Holt's adult ratification precedent 2 0
also a case of a formerly unenforceable obligation. Sweeping dictum in an 1826 English opinion exhibited the strong judicial support for moral obligation then in the air. Chief Justice Best wrote
that the promise to apply a legacy to pay a former debt was binding because he said, in a Mansfieldian flourish, "There was a
281. Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 281, 283 n.1 (1819).
282. Edwards, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) at 283 n.1 (1819).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1) (1981).
284. 102 Eng. Rep. 759 (1803).
285. Cooper, 102 Eng. Rep. at 761; Hayes, 93 Eng. Rep. at 950; Osborne v. Rogers, 85
Eng. Rep. 318 n.1 (1798).
286. 127 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1809).
287. The court seemed to adopt the plaintiffs argument that the debt would be enforced
in equity. Barnes, 127 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
288. 128 Eng. Rep. 599 (1813).
289. Lee, 128 Eng. Rep. at 603; Goodright ex. dim. Elizabeth Carter v. Straphan, 98
Eng. Rep. 1043 (1774).
290. Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (1697).
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moral obligation to pay; and I hope that the judges of Westminster
Hall will always hold, that a moral obligation to pay is sufficient
consideration for a promise to pay."291
B.

JudicialReaction Against Growth in Moral Obligation

Judicial interest in the Wennall note appeared initially in some
jurisdictions in the United States during the third quarter of the
nineteenth century.29 2 The first judicial breach noticed in the long
line of moral obligation cases came in 1825 in the oft-cited Massachusetts decision Mills v. Wyman.293 Relief was denied on a father's promise to reimburse for care provided to his ill adult son
while he was on a journey. The facts justified the outcome, for
such a promise would not be enforceable even today in most jurisdictions since no benefit flowed directly to the promisor. Chief
Justice Parker had liberally applied moral obligation ideas in an
earlier decision,2 94 but the language in his rationale in Mills v.
Wyman was overly broad in denying the application of moral obligation principle to any facts beyond the scope of the English
waiver and ratification precedents.29 Parker referred to no common law decision for the proposition that only promises on prior
legal obligations now barred were binding; rather, he cited "the
very able review of all the cases in the note in. . ." Wennall v. Ad296
ney.
An English court arrived at the same conclusion as Mills v.
Wyman fifteen years later. In Eastwood v. Kenyon 2 " English
Chief Justice Denman disingenuously claimed that "[hiowever
general the expressions used by Lord Mansfield may at first sight
appear," a careful reading of his decisions showed that he did not

291. Wells v. Horton, Executor of Blisset, 172 Eng. Rep. 173, 175 (1826).
292. It has been suggested that the rejection of Mansfieldian flexibility in the U.S. in
doctrinaire jurisdictions like Massacusetts earlier than in England may have been due to a
split among American judges between Federalists and Jeffersonians; the latter, while supportive of natural law, were opposed to unbridled prerogative. See Robert Stevens, Basic
Concepts and Current Differences in English and American Law, 6 J. LEG. HIsT. 336, 33839 (1985); Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV.
629, 642-46 (1933).
293. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
294. Bowers v. Hurd, 10 Mass. 427 (1813) (ruling binding a note given to the plaintiff, a
friend who had "regularly attended" the now deceased promisor).
295. Mills, 20 Mass. at 209-10 (Parker asserted that society has left a promise like the
father's to the "tribunal of one's conscience.").
296. Id. at 212.
297. 113 Eng. Rep. 482 (1840).
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go beyond Holt's waiver and ratification exceptions."' Denman
rightly stated that Mansfield's loose dictum about moral obligation
had gone too far; but rather than stopping there, he employed the
Wennall note to deny the validity of any moral obligation decision
over the prior four centuries if it strayed beyond Holt's precedents. 9 9 Denman and his conservative common law brethren extinguished the moral obligation principle from English law to such
an extent that a modern English contract treatise writer recently
has written that the moral obligation theory "[1]abel has become
unfashionable" since it no longer exists in English law, other than
waiver and ratification."0 So after three centuries of recognition of
a moral obligation alternative to bargain, English judges of the
mid-nineteenth century returned common law contract to the position it held in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, 0 ' Holt's
precedents excepted. After flirting with liberalizing continental
ideas in the half century after Mansfield introduced policy into the
common law contract,3 2 pedantic common law judges, educated at
the inns of court, returned to their self-contained legal system, a
system Dawson referred to as "the application of methods of legal
positivism to a system of case law."33 The American practice of
borrowing fertilizing ideas from sister states fell into disuse in the
increasingly hidebound single case law system of England and
Wales.0 4 What perhaps should have perplexed even the dogmatic
English theoretician was that, in the process of Denman purging
the law of the Enlightenment ideas of the previous eighty years,
Denman jettisoned indigenous common law moral obligation
precedent that preceded Mansfield. English law might have
bounced back from this reaction, as American jurisdictions would
do, if English common law judges had shared the later American
view that fusion of law and equity allowed courts to follow equity's
flexible practices in equity of adjusting precedent to obtain a fair
298. Eastwood, 113 Eng. Rep. at 486.
299. Id. at 485.
300. GUENTHER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 76 (10' ed. 1999).
301. Hunt v. Bate, 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (1568).
302. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAw, 116, 128-32, 240-44 (1987) (suggesting that English jurists fell under sway
of Bentham and Austin's legal positivism wherein policy was to emanate from legislature
and not courts).
303. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 260, at 20.
304. See Karl N. Llewelyn, Book Review, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 944, 948-49 (1940) (portraying an English method of tight "articulate casuistry" with little concern for case results); cf.
S.F.C. Milsom, A Pageant in Modern Dress, 84 YALE L. J. 1585, 1587-88 (1975) (yearning
for the reforming effect that a restatement could have on England's single jurisdiction).
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result.3 °5 So the development of a modern moral obligation principle became exclusively a story of American adaptations and extensions of earlier English moral obligation ideas to fit their new environment.3 ° s
Mills v. Wyman was not cited that often in the case law;0 7 nevertheless, it became a leading American case because of the emphasis given it by treatise writers.0 ' In Kent's second edition of
his Commentaries in 1830, he declared that a moral obligation
constitutes consideration only when a prior legal obligation had
existed.0 9 Parsons cited Mills v. Wyman in 1855 and provided an
abstract of Eastwood v. Kenyon. 3" Langdell emphasized Mills v.
Wyman in his books published in 1871 and 1880 and stated that
waivers and ratification were the extent of moral obligation's applicability.'
In 1889, the English contract writer Pollock admitted that, "For a long time it was thought that the existence of a
previous moral obligation . . . would support an express prom305. The 1873 English Judicature Act had seemed to say that thereafter when there was
a conflict between rules at law and in equity, equity prevailed, but common law judges
quickly denied that equity superseded rules at-law. Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66, § 25
(1873); cf. Brian v. Rossiter, 11 Q.B.D. 123 (1879) (saying equity could not supersede law).
That conservative view held sway until near the end of the twentieth century when restitution was finally recognized as an independent branch of private law. See also Raymond
Evershed, Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity After 75 Years, 70 L. Q. REV. 326,
327-28 (1954) (arguing that equity's rule was only to complement and fulfill the common
law but not to supersede it); but cf. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd, 2 App. Cas. 548, 55859, 579 (recognizing field of unjust enrichment and ruling that rule of equity would prevail
over conflicting rule at-law).
306. American and English lawyers and judges share the mode of legal analysis
spawned during the year books era, but on the view of malleability of precedent, they
parted ways in the nineteenth century with many states republican experimentation with
natural law ideas, excepting the American formalism hiccup during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.
307. See Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunals of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749, 1787-788 (1997) (indicating that a Lexis search of hundreds of
moral obligation cases unearthed only 27 citations of Mills, 11 in Massachusetts, where it
hasn't been cited since 1906).
308. Well into the twentieth century, the Williston treatise continued to defend the
certainty provided by a strict application of past consideration rule. See 1 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 148 (1957 3d ed. Jaeger). Since the
publication of Restatement Second § 86, a 1992 edition stated the reform "sacrifices some
certainty" and yet, despite all of that treatise's earlier qualifications, this edition somehow
managed to say that § 86 was largely consistent with prior case law. 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:12 (1992 4' ed. Lord). When reading this late
twentieth century edition of the conservative treatise, one can still hear the mid-nineteenth
century voice of Theophilus Parsons, whose treatise Williston edited in 1893.
309. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 465 (2d ed. 1830).
310. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 358-61 (2d ed. 1855).
311. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 367
(1871) [hereinafter LANGDELL, CASES] (republishing Mills in its entirety); LANGDELL,
SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 89-100.
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ise,"312 but that view had become "exploded ground." 31 3 And Williston's 1893 edition of Parsons' treatise claimed that the cases had
settled the question "definitively" that, retaining Parson's quote of
the conservative English judge Baron Parke, "a mere moral consideration is nothing," outside waivers and adult ratification.31 4
These contract law commentators promoted predictable first principles to provide uniformity for business planning in a federal system, and with that aim in mind, they chose as leading decisions
those that ignored the scattered moral obligation precedents that
caused occasional exceptional outcomes under the moral obligation
principle.3 15
C.

Some Nineteenth Century JurisdictionsDid Not Retreat

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century in the United
States, American courts employed natural law solutions similar to
what English courts were doing contemporaneously. Lawyers and
judges of the young republic gained creative energy from the natural law view that morals were relevant to the new body of American law being formed." 6 The case reports are replete with moral
obligation decisions, and Mansfield's moral obligation cases were
regularly cited throughout the century.31 7 The influential state of
New York, led by its Chief Justice Kent, was a big supporter. In
an 1804 case, Justice Kent's indicated in dictum that the circumstances of a benefit passing to the promisor obviated the officiousness concern of the past consideration rule.31 Kent cited Wilmot,
J.'s famous dictum in Pillans v. Van Mierop that past considera-

312. FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 168 (5" ed. 1889).
313. Id. at 170.
314. 1 THEOHPILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445 (8" ed. Williston 1893);
Jennings v. Brown, 152 Eng. Rep. 210, 212 (1842) (Parke). In the end, Parke actually
found a bargain to support the moral obligation promise. Id.
315. Holmes' support for the objective standard added an element to Kent's definition of
consideration and contributed to excluding natural law and morality from contract law.
See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 293, 301. See also 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 6 (2d ed. 1855); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
148 (stating that strict application of past consideration rule promotes certainty).
316. See GULIAN C. VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS 187, 189,
193, 206, 217 (1826) (urging that law of morals ought to apply throughout contract law).
317. See, e.g., Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 33, 38 (1812); State, Use of Stevenson, v.
Reigart, 1 Gill (Md.) 1, 6 (1843); McMorris v. Herndon, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 56 (1830); Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476 (1853); Early v. Mahon, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 147 (1821); Ferguson v.
Harris, 17 S.E. 782, 786 (S.C. 1893); Hurst v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Ass'n, 26 A. 956, 958
(Md. 1893); Drake v. Bell, 55 N.Y.S. 945, 946 (1899).
318. Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. R. 583, 585 (N.Y. 1804).
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tion cases were "melting down into common sense, of late times.""
After Kent became Chief Justice of New York's top common law
court, a per curiam opinion in Comstock v. Smith cited Mansfield
for the more conservative proposition that: "a beneficial consideration and a request are necessarily implied from the moral obligation. " 32O After Kent moved over to Chancery,"' in Early v.
Mahon, Spencer, C. J. enforced a subsequent promise made to
cure a usurious contract because "the promise subsequently to
repay this money, was founded on a moral and equitable duty."32 '
Doctrinal obstructions raised by the Wennall note were overcome or ignored in the United States until decisions like Mills v.
Wyman insisted upon the Wennall note's exclusive bargain
model.323 Whether or not the Mills approach represented the majority position in the country by mid-century, treatise writers
probably succeeded in effectuating that result during the second
half of the nineteenth century.324 The formalist shift of those
courts which followed the dogma of legal commentators constituted a reaction against the earlier instances of common law decisions identifying law with morals. Now that the creative work of
fashioning a legal system and a body of precedent had been finished, support for natural law notions of moral ideals was being
transformed into an urge to stabilize the system through clear
precedent.32 5 Kent's shift in view reflected that transition; in the
early decades of the century, he wrote judicial opinions in support
of growth in the use of moral obligation,3 2 but by 1830 treatise
writer Kent supported the principle set forth in Mills v. Wyman in

319. Id.; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1039 (1765). Pillans had been repulsed by English House of Lords. See Rann v. Hughes, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n. (H.L. 1778).
320. Comstock v. Smith, 7 Johns. 87, 88 (N.Y. 1810).
321. James Kent would sit as Chancellor of New York's Court of Chancery from 1814 to
1823.
322. Early, 19 Johns. at 150 (N.Y. 1821). Mansfield's controversial decision in Hawkes v.
Saunders was cited for the proposition. Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782).
323. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 212 (1825).
324. Langdell would republish Mills v.Wyman in its entirety. LANGDELL, CASES, supra
note 311, at 367.
325. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 100-05 (1938) [hereinafter POUND, FORMATIVE ERA]. The certainty goal required curtailment of jury discretion.
Before the end of the first quarter of the century, detailed jury instructions were introduced
and became routine and new trials granted when rules of evidence not followed. See
WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 3-4, 7, 8, 167-68; see also A.W.B.
Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 600
(1979) (stating that dethronement of jury came with reception of civil law notions).
326. E.g., Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. R. 583, 585 (N.Y. 1804); Comstock v. Smith, 7
Johns. 87, 88 (N.Y. 1810).
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his Commentaries.12' Kent, Parsons, Langdell, Holmes and Williston32 would be at the vanguard throughout the remainder of the
nineteenth century in assuring reception of English common law
to the exclusion of French civil law ideas urged by American natural law adherents such as Laussat and Verplanck.2 9 However,
treatise writers' declarations of the prevailing rule in no way
meant that anything near overwhelming support existed for a
strict application of the past consideration rule.
A significant grouping of state courts did not, however, abandon
their moral obligation ideas during the remainder of the nineteenth century. The continuing adherents during the first half of
the century were Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Vermont, North Carolina, South Carolina and Alabama,3 3 ° and, during the second half of the century, they were
joined by Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Missouri, Maryland, Georgia and Washington. 3 ' These states had not forgotten
their egalitarian republican roots in the moral ideals of natural
law. Furthermore, notions of morals and ethics imbedded in equity would have contributed since many American jurisdictions
had operated under fused or partially-fused courts of law and equity from statehood. A survey of American courts provided in an
appendix to Laussat's 1826 work on equity in Pennsylvania indicated that four states had no exercise of equitable powers and four
had fully separate courts of law and equity; however, ten states
had fully fused courts of law and equity and four others had a part

327. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 465 (2d ed. 1830).
328. Id. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 360 (2d ed. 1855); LANGDELL,
CASES, supra note 311, at 370; Holmes, supra note 228, at 458-64; 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445 (Williston ed. 8' ed. 1893); cf. MORTON J. HORwrTz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1870 - 1960) 136, 140 (1992) (arguing that Holmes'
separation of law and morals and his emphasis on external standards was attack upon
natural rights theory); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND
THE INNER SELF 154 (1993) (commenting Holmes wanted to purge common law of moral
content by emphasizing objective and external).
329. LAUSSAT, supra note 28, at 90; VERPLANCK, supra note 316, at 187-93; see POUND,
FORMATIVE ERA, supra note 325, at 144 (seeing shift from republican creation of ideas to
faith in historical doctrine by late 1830s).
330. E.g., Greeves v. McAllister, 2 Binn. 591 (Pa. 1809); Nixon v. Jenkins, 1 Hill. 318
(N.Y. 1857); Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 (1828); Hatchell v. Odom, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.)
302 (1836); McMorris v. Herndon, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 56 (1830); Hatch v. Purcell, 21 N.H.
544 (1850); Glass v. Beach, 5 Vt. 172 (1833); Vance v. Wells, 8 Ala. 399 (1845).
331. See, e.g., Spear v. Griffith, 86 Ill. 552 (1877); Hurst v. Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n, 26
A. 956 (Md. 1893); Edwards v. Braasted, 16 N.W. 261 (Mich. 1883); Gwinn v. Simes, 16 Mo.
335 (1875); McElven v. Sloan, 56 Ga. 208 (1876); Muir v. Kane, 104 P. 153 (Wash. 1909);
Bevan v. Tomlinson, 25 Ind. 25 (1865); Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637 (1870).
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of equity jurisdiction with their courts of law." 2 Perhaps not surprisingly, Massachusetts, whose court authored Mills v. Wyman,
was one of the four which had no court exercising equity powers.
Having said this about the liberalizing effects of fusion in the
young republic, it would be inaccurate to say that the same degree
of adherence to natural law ideas of morality existed by the end of
the nineteenth century as many courts reverted to a formalist
preference for the predictability of traditional contract doctrine.3
Nevertheless, support for moral obligation continued in some
states throughout the nineteenth century, including the influential states of Pennsylvania and New York." 4 One only has to read
case law reports in these states during the latter part of the century to see continuing citations to Mansfield and references to equitable and moral obligations constituting legal obligations in order to see that American law had not forgotten its natural law
roots.
But how did states supportive of moral obligation rationalize the
presence of consideration? Two approaches predominated. The
most common solution involved the manipulation of contract doctrine as a means to feign the presence of a bargain, but a few jurisdictions came to the straightforward conclusion that the moral
obligation standing alone constituted consideration. First, as to
the more common nineteenth century method of doctrinal manipulation,3 35 New York courts followed Serjeant Williams' suggestion336
that the plaintiffs conferment of a benefit on the promisor could
imply a previous request3 37 or, a bit later, that the subsequent
promise was the equivalent of a previous request.3 Williams per332. LAUSSAT, supra note 28 at 153-57.
333. Illinois is an example. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Illinois
applied a liberal view of the moral obligation principle. See Spear, 86 111. at 552; Lawrence
v. Oglesby, 52 N.E. 945 (Ill. 1899). However, Illinois courts employed a formalist application of the past consideration rule during the first half of the twentieth century. See Hart
v. Strong, 55 N.E. 629 (Ill. 1899); Strayer v. Dickerson, 68 N.E. 767 (111. 1903); Finch v.
Green, 80 N.E. 318 (Ill. 1907); Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., 20 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill.
1937) ("Early Illinois cases ... recognize (moral obligation's) validity. But their doctrine has
been modified and no longer prevails in Illinois.").
334. E.g., Stebbins v. County of Crawford, 92 Pa. 289 (1879); Anderson v. Best, 35 A. 194
(Pa. 1896); Drake v. Bell, 55 N.Y. S. 945 (1899).
335. For a more detailed study of the techniques employed by 19th century courts to find
moral obligations binding, see TEEVEN, supra note 41, at 105-114 (1998).
336. Osborne v. Rogers, 85 Eng. Rep. 318, 319 n.1 (1798).
337. E.g., Comstock, 7 Johns. At 88 (N.Y. 1810); Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. 243, 244
(N.Y. 1813).
338. E.g., Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378, 382 (N.Y. 1817); Nixon v. Jenkins, 1 Hill. 318
(N.Y. 1857).
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verted the dictum in Hayes v. Warren to encourage the view that a
bargain could be grounded upon the plaintiffs act in response to
the defendant's implied previous request.3 39 The fiction of the implied previous request appealed to the conservative common lawyer's demand for adherence to supposed doctrine; and, in this respect, it paid obeisance to the inaccurate but influential denials, in
both Hayes v. Warren and the Wennall note, of the existence of a
long standing separate strain of promissory liability grounded
upon moral obligation.34 °
The less common, and more radical, approach was the straightforward declaration, without alleging a feigned bargain, that
moral obligation constituted sufficient consideration, also referred
to as moral consideration. A Pennsylvania judge suggested this in
1809,341 and three years later Tilghman, C.J. announced in Clark
v. Herring: "a moral obligation alone is sufficient consideration for
an assumption."3 42 Tilghman added that other worthy moral obliwaiver. 11
gation promises existed besides a statute of limitations
His sources were Mansfield's criticized decision in Atkins v. Hill
and a 1748 ruling of Chancellor Hardwick.344 Pennsylvania's fused
345
courts followed this modern approach from that decision onward.
Thereafter, Pennsylvania courts cited Clark v. Herring without
339. Id.; Hayes v. Warren, 93 Eng. Rep. 950 (1731).
340. See Samuel Stoljar, No Obituary for Wennall v. Adney, 11 J. LEG. HIST. 250, 260
(1990).
341. See Greeves v. MAllister, 2 Binn. 591, 592 (Pa. 1809). Rush, J. spoke of the implied
request fiction but also that the plaintiffs conferral of a benefit went "to the morality and
honesty of the promise on the part of the defendant." Id. at 593.
342. Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. 33, 36 (Pa. 1812). The doctrinal common lawyer's lawyer,
Holt, C.J., found consideration in his inviolate waiver and ratification precedents without
manipulating consideration doctrine in order to fabricate a bargain. In Ball, 90 Eng. Rep.
at 541, Holt said there was "good consideration" for adult's ratification, and in Heyling,, 91
Eng. Rep. at 1158, he said waiver of statute of limitations was "in consideration that" the
sale had occurred.
343. Clark, 5 Binn. at 37.
344. Id. at 37-38; Atkins v. Hill, 98 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1775); Reech v. Kennegal, 27 Eng.
Rep. 932, 933 (Ch. 1748). In a curious republican twist, Tilghman said that a Pennsylvania
statute permitted him to cite early Mansfield moral obligation cases, including Mansfield's
1774 trial decision in Rann v. Hughes, but that the statute precluded him from citing English precedents subsequent to July 4, 1776, which included the House of Lords stern language in Rann v. Hughes in upending Mansfield's moral obligation ideas in Pillans v. Van
Mierop. Id. at 37; Rann, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1014 n.a. Oddly, the case that best symbolized
the House of Lords' disapproval of Mansfield's continental ideas in the King's Bench was
not published until it was tacked onto a 1797 case report as a note.
is a
345. E.g., Nesmith v. Drum, 8 Watts. & Serg. 9, 10 (Pa. 1844) ("a moral obligation ...
consideration for an express contract."); Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 367, 372 (1855) ("a
moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a direct promise."); Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa.
95, 98 (1868) ("benefit derived from the unsolicited services of another creates a moral
sufficient to sustain an express assumption.").
obligation ...
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any reference to English decisions. Such was the pattern for the
creation of a body of precedent in the young republic.
New York also experimented with this more radical equitable
approach of moral consideration in Bentley v. Morse,46 an 1817
case of a creditor promising to return one payment to a debtor who
had paid a debt twice. The court stated: "there was such a moral
obligation on the part of the [creditor] to refund the money, as
would be a good consideration to support an assumpsit."3 47 In reporter Johnson's note to the Bentley case, he carped on the doctrinal point, also found in the Wennall note, that no prior legal
obligation had existed in these facts." 8 New York then appeared
to hesitate, perhaps in reaction to Johnson's note and Mills v.
Wyman34 eight years later, and retreated in its rationalizations of
moral obligation decisions to the artifices of either a fictional implied previous request or that the promise was the equivalent of a
previous request.5 0 For the next eighty years, Bentley v. Morse
was restricted to a narrow Holt-like exception... for cases of a
debtor paying twice.352 Thus New York courts continued to grant
moral obligation relief but under the formalist guise of contrived
compliance with bargain doctrine. New York employed the fiction
techniques until the end of the century when the decision in Drake
v. Bell353 returned New York law to the civilian solution in Bentley
346. 14 Johns. 468 (N.Y. 1817).
347. Bentley, 14 Johns. at 468. Vermont also experimented with finding of consideration
without concern for the use of fictions. See Seymour v. Town of Marlboro, 40 Vt. 171, 179
(1868) ("The consideration upon which it was made, moved from the plaintiff, was meritorious and beneficial.").
348. Id. at 468 n. ("This doctrine is not fully sustained by the authorities. The better
doctrine seems to be that the moral obligation must have a prior legal or equitable claim
connected with it."). Johnson's inclusion of prior "equitable claim" was, however, more
liberal than the Wennall reporters.
349. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209-10 (1825).
350. E.g., Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97, 99 (N.Y. 1840) (citing Hunt v. Bate that consideration not present without a previous request, except for waivers and ratifications, but
then acknowledging implied request fiction could be used); Nixon v. Jenkins, 1 Hill. (N.Y.)
318 (1857) (saying promise equivalent of previous request).
351. Doctrinalists had tried to restrict Holt's moral obligation decisions to the specific
facts of those cases. Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (1697) (adult ratification); Heylings
v. Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157, 1179 (1699) (statute of limitations waiver).
352. See, e.g., Cameron v. Fowler, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 306, 308-09 (1843) (stating that "the
principle of Bentley v. Morse" applied when debtor had paid a debt that creditor nevertheless obtained judgment on). From at least the fifteenth century, chancery provided relief
based on 'reason and conscience" when a debtor on a sealed instrument was required to
pay twice because of his inability to produce proof of acquittance. See Barbour, Contract in
Equity, supra note 1, at 85-89.
353. 55 N.Y.S. 945 (1899). Gaynor, J. stated: "If the rule so plainly stated by Lord Mansfield, that a moral obligation was of itself sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise,
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v. Morse. The contractor in Drake v. Bell had repaired the wrong
vacant house, and subsequently the defendant promised to pay for
the unsolicited repairs to his house. Gaynor, J. made a point-bypoint frontal attack against the English doctrinal positions in the
Wennall note and in Eastwood v. Kenyon.35 4 He distinguished Mills
v. Wyman because the defendant in Drake received a benefit to his
property unlike the father in Mills who promised to pay for the
care given to his adult son."' Gaynor found consideration for the
promise in the promisor's prior receipt of a material benefit.5 6
This was the moral obligation alternative to bargain as consideration. Gaynor's leading decision had openly slain the doctrinal
warhorses of the nineteenth century in the most important jurisdiction in the country. Drake v. Bell and Bentley v. Morse would
be acknowledged as models for the moral obligation principle
stated in Restatement Second of Contracts section 86 . Yet, Williston steadfastly clung to the doctrinaire position in the Wennall
note in his final draft of the first Restatement in 1928,"'a despite
the reality that New York and Pennsylvania, the two most popu-

had been followed, the sole question in each case would be whether there was a moral obligation to support." Id. at 946.
354. Drake, 55 N.Y.S. at 946-47. Gaynor said Denman in Eastwood v. Kenyon used
overly broad exclusionary language in objecting to Mansfield's overly inclusionary language. Id.; accord Ferguson v. Harris, 17 S.E. 782, 786 (S.C. 1893) (clarifying that Denman
ignored the distinction between a promise made under no obligation, legal or moral, and a
promise made on account of moral obligation of receiving benefit); Muir v. Kane, 104 P. 153,
156 (Wash. 1909). As to the Wennall note, Gaynor said Wennall reporters were incorrect
that ratification of a minor was a formerly enforceable legal obligation. Id. at 246-47; accord Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N.Y. 604, 608-9 (1863) (pointing out that adult ratification
was not of a legal obligation originally enforceable at law, and likewise case of a promise
under coverture); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681, 683 (1864); Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me.
475, 481 (1843).
355. Drake, 55 N.Y.S. at 946; accordBoothe, 36 Vt. at 684.
356. Drake, 55 N.Y.S. at 945, 947 (1899).
357. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. c (1981) (explaining that illustrations 4 and 5 were based on Drake v. Bell and Bentley v. Morse, respectively).
358. Williston would continue to repeat the logic of the Wennall note in his drafts of
Restatement of Contractsin the 1920s, as he had a generation earlier in his 1893 edition of
Parsons' treatise. Indeed, even Lord's 1992 edition of Williston's treatise still seemed reluctant to encourage the Restatement (Second) § 86 position, saying that the "vast majority of
jurisdictions in the United States have rejected the principle that a moral obligation might
support a subsequent promise," this despite the fact that his footnotes are replete with case
citations in numerous jurisdictions which have gone at least as far as Restatement (Second).
1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445 n., 446 n. (Williston 8th ed. 1893); 4
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON OF CONTRACTS § 8:12 (Lord 4th ed. 1992) (claiming that
Restatement Second "moves cautiously in this area" and that the drafters "eschew the term
,moral obligation.' ") This writer agrees with the-Lord edition that the Restatement (Second) has moved cautiously but, contrary to Lord's view, too cautiously. This of course is the
point of the present study.
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lous states, had, along with other states, reformed the law a century earlier.
D.

Treatment of Moral Obligation in Restatements

Reporter Williston's final draft of the Restatement (1928) subscribed to the position taken in the Wennall note and so treated
the past consideration rule as having remained static since the
sixteenth century, except for Holt's waiver and ratification precedents set at the end of the seventeenth century.3 59 Williston accorded no recognition whatsoever the broader moral obligation
principle in the hundreds of decisions to be found in American
case reports over the previous 125 years. In support of Williston's
goal of encouraging predictability in commerce,36 ° he portrayed
American contract law as having remained as impervious to natural law ideas as England had permanently become by the middle
of the nineteenth century. Williston's conservatism notwithstanding, the pull of moral obligation ideas proved too strong, and the
flow of decisions grounded on a wider moral obligation principle
continued to flow unabated in a substantial minority of jurisdictions.
When the drafters of a second restatement began their review of
the past consideration rule in the early 1960s, Williston's treatise
continued to support the rule's strict application.36 ' The drafters
concluded, however, that they could not ignore the undeniable
presence in the case law of the variety of moral obligation decisions falling outside the boundaries of Holt's exceptions. From the
"wide variety of miscellany" in the case law, the drafters of the
second restatement captured the "principle"6 2 that: "A promise
made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.",6 3 In the American Law Institute Proceedings in
1965, Reporter Braucher explained that the drafters were focusing
on cases of subsequent promises that removed doctrinal difficulties on facts which were neither gratuitous nor quite qualified for
359. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 86-89 (1932).
360. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 148 (W. Jaeger
3d ed. 1957) (lauding the certainty afforded by strict application of past consideration rule).
361. Id. at § 142.
362. 42 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 273-74 (1965).
363. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A(1) was proposed in Tentative Draft
No. 2 in 1965 and was approved in the same form in 1979 and published two years later as
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981).
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quasi contract relief.. 4 In so doing, the drafters of the second restatement rejected the wrongheaded denial of the Wennall reporters that precedents did not exist for promissory liability in the absence of a bargain. In adopting section 86 in 1979, the drafters
isolated one of the sub-principles of the moral obligation principle
found in the case law. Section 86 of the Second Restatement
enunciates the conventional moral obligation recognized in English and American jurisdictions by the early nineteenth century. 65
The restaters were certainly correct that moral obligation promises on account of the receipt of a material benefit have been enforced in cases since the late seventeenth century. The promisor's
receipt of a benefit had been acknowledged as a worthy moral obligation from at least Holt's waiver and ratification precedents. In
his 1699 statute of limitations waiver decision, Holt said "in consideration that" the sale had occurred, the defendant waived the
statute. 6 6 And in his 1697 adult ratification precedent, he stated:
"Ruled, that where the defendant under age borrowed money of
the plaintiff, and afterwards at full age promised to pay it him,
this is a good consideration for the promise."6 7 In both cases, the
promisors' felt moral obligations to pay for the benefits received
prompted the subsequent waiver and ratification. Following this
strand through the case law after Holt, most of Mansfield's moral
obligation decisions fit the receipt of material benefit model. A
decade after Mansfield's retirement in 1788, Serjeant Williams
tried to adapt moral obligation precedents to the dictum in Hayes
v. Warren, by his suggestion to pleaders: "But where a party derives a benefit from the consideration it is sufficient because
equivalent of a previous request."3 66 Then four years later, even
the redoubtable Wennall note underlined the importance of the
material benefit strand by marginalizing any prior precedent that
did not conform to the requirement that "in each instance the
party bound by the promise had received a benefit previous to the
364. 42 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 273-74 (1965); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cmts. b, e (1981).
365. Modern commentators' encouragement of restitutionary relief is a particular example of abandonment of generality in favor of fact-specific equitable relief. Ames, Keener
and Corbin were progenitors of this approach in the Restatement of Restitution and indirectly of recognition of the modern moral obligation principle.
366. Heyling v. Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157, 1158 (1699).
367. Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (1697).
368. Osborne v. Rogers, 85 Eng. Rep. 318, 319 n.1 (1798); Hayes v. Warren, 93 Eng. Rep.
950 (1731). As recently as 1965, a Maryland court cited Sjt. Williams' note regarding implied request. Reece v. Reece, 212 A. 2d 468 (Md. 1965).
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promise. " "' In beating back Mansfield's sometimes overly broad
civilian dictum3 70 in a few of his decisions,371 the Wennall reporters
went too far and denied valid moral obligation precedents decided
before Mansfield which did not involve either a prior legal obligation or the promisor's previous receipt of a benefit.
In the early republican period, American courts treated a promisor's receipt of a material benefit as a basis for an exception to
the past consideration rule. In the 1809 Pennsylvania decision
Greeves v. M'Allister,373 the court said consideration was present
for the defendant's promise, made on account of the plaintiffs aid
to the defendant in collecting a debt owed to the defendant,
"[blecause the defendant, had in fact, derived a very important
benefit and advantage at the expense and labor of the plaintiff."73
3 74 rendered
In the New York per curiam decision Hicks v. Burhans,
a year before Kent, C.J. left the common law court to become
Chancellor, the promisor's receipt of benefit strand of moral obligation was adopted for the first time in New York by acceptance of
Kent's 1804 dictum3 7 that: "In many cases a request may be inferred from the beneficial nature of the consideration, and the circumstances of the transaction."3 76
Six years subsequent to Hicks v. Burhans, the New York court
in Edwards v. Davis3 77 was presented with the question of whether
a benefit could be received by someone other than the promisor.
The defendant, a widow, had promised to pay for maintenance
that the plaintiff had provided her indigent parents. The court
responded that the lack of benefit to the defendant "[niegate[s] the
369. Wennall v. Adney, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 n.a. (1802).
370. Reporter Johnson said in 1819: "[olur law does not go the length of the civil law in
enforcing a naked promise, or mere moral obligation." Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281,
283 n.9 (N.Y. 1819).
371. E.g., Atkins v. Hill, 98 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1090 (1775); Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1091 (1782).
372. 2 Bin. 591 (Pa. 1809).
373. Id. at 591. The court continued and said this was "[a] rational explanation from the
liberal ideas that actuate modem courts of justice" when "a party be under either a legal or
moral obligation to pay" and cited as authority a bastard maintenance case, whose facts did
not involve receipt of benefits by promisor. Id. at 592. The bastard maintenance case the
court would have probably been referring to would have been either Anonymous., 89 Eng.
Rep 879 (1682) or Scott v. Nelson (1763) reported in 127 Eng. Rep. 138 n.a. (1802).
374. 10 Johns. 243 (N.Y. 1813).
375. Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. R. 583, 585 (N.Y. 1804).
376. Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. 243, 244 (N.Y. 1813); Livingston, 1 Cai. R. at 585; see
Comstock v. Smith, 7 Johns. 87, 88 (N.Y. 1810) (dictum).
377. 16 Johns. 281 (N.Y. 1819) (widow "undertook" to pay sister for necessaries provided
parents). Two possibly gratuitous elements appear in case since promisee was her sister
and beneficiaries were parents.
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idea that any request was made by her."3 7" Reporter Johnson supplied a note to Edwards v. Davis wherein he said this decision was
consistent with the Wennall note's requirements that a benefit
had to flow to the promisor." Although the Edwards v. Davis
court seemed more liberal than the Wennall note, since it seemed
willing to enforce promises beyond Holt's precedents, the court
remained in line with the spirit of the Wennall note in the refusal
of moral obligations that did not include a benefit flowing directly
to the promisor.38 ° Like the Wennall note, the Edwards v. Davis
court denied a line of moral obligation precedents that would have
provided relief. Section 86 of the Second Restatement has basically not gone beyond the scope of the 1819 ruling in Edwards v.
Davis in the use of the consensual theory to bind this category of
moral obligation promise, in the absence of a bargain, for benefits
received by the promisor.
Section 86 may seem a big step past the archaic position of the
first Restatement,"'1 but a closer look shows that, in drawing from
the miscellany in the case law,38 Section 86 did not throw its net
very wide since it did not stray from the ambit of the Wennall
note's demand that a benefit had to flow directly to the promisor.3
The drafters of the second restatement were under-inclusive because other judicially recognized strands are imbedded in the
moral obligation principle." 4 As Corbin observed, the Wennall
note did not halt growth in the field of moral obligation, nor did
Section 86 constitute a complete, immutable principle because, as
he said, "Sometimes, and perhaps here, the best we can do is review the collected experience, without attempting any general and
all-inclusive statement."3 8 The structure of the American moral
obligation principle resides in the operative groups of facts, based
on prior decisions, which provide predictions for future decisions of
378. Edwards, 16 Johns. at 286 (disagreeing with Comstock v. Smith dictum that benefit
might be implied from moral obligation alone. See Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97, 99 (1899)
(saying not binding since no benefit to promisor).
379. Edwards, 16 Johns. at 283 n.1.
380. Wennall v. Adney, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, at 138 n.a. (1802).
381. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 86-89 (1932). Perhaps the appearance of the first
contracts restatement prior to the Restatement of Restitution in 1937 caused the Restatement Second of Contracts to overly focus on restitutionary promises.
382. 42 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 273-74 (1965).
383. Wennall, 127 Eng. Rep. at 138 n.a.
384. See DAWSON, GIFTS, supra note 144, at 226-27; E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and
Paternalism,41 WM. MARY L. REV. 385, 395 (2000) (seeing decline in belief that individuals
know best, as reflected in judicial refusal to enforce gift promises).
385. 1A CORBIN, supra note 144, at §§ 230, 231.
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judges.386 Prior decisional law has accommodated a broader range
of promises than that covered by moral obligation sub-principle
isolated by those who drafted the second restatement for the promisor's prior receipt of a benefit.
E.

Toward A BroaderMoral ObligationPrinciple

In the remainder of this study of the moral obligation principle
at common law, consideration will be given to two fields of moral
obligation decisions in which relief has been granted on factual
parameters not encompassed by Section 86, namely, restitutionary
promises for benefits received by someone other than the promisor
himself and promises to atone for harm caused. The intent here
is not to state these two additional sub-principles of moral obligation in terms of majority and minority positions but rather to set
out these instances of a broader principle that courts of law and
equity have drawn upon to realize just results consistent with
Starting with the sub-principle of
community expectations."'
promises on benefits not received directly by the promisor, some
courts have enforced moral obligation promises when the benefit
of necessaries flowed to promisor's dependents and not to the
promisor. Enforcement of promises to pay for necessaries provided to dependents, in the caregiver's absence, fulfills community
expectations that these voluntary beneficial acts will be recompensed, when restitution is unavailable, if a moral obligation
promise is extended in return.
As to promises for emergency necessaries provided to a loved
one, it can be said that the genesis of all moral obligation recovery
at common law stems from the sixteenth century decision of Style
v. Smith,"' wherein a father promised a physician to pay him for
the cure of his son administered while the father was away. Style
v. Smith was the originating moral obligation precedent that successfully deviated from the past consideration rule bar enunciated
in Hunt v. Bate; Hunt v. Bate had also stated what was necessary
to establish a bargain. 89 In contrast to the market bargain, emer386. See 3A id. at § 624.
387. Cf. 42 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 273-74 (1965) (commenting on a
tentative draft of what became Section 86 on the same point regarding majority and minority positions).
388. reported in 74 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (1588).
389. Hunt v. Bate, 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (1568) (requiring defendant's request previous to
the plaintiff acting in order for a bargain to be formed). The facts in Style v. Smith are
distinguishable from Hunt v. Bate in that the previous benefit in Hunt was the bailing out
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79

gency services are not past consideration in a meaningful sense
because they are provided in such circumstances that the possibilities of negotiation and a previous request are unrealistic. The
principle applicable to emergency necessaries is not an implied-inlaw category akin to negotiorum gestio for actions of officious dogooders;39 ° rather it concerns the narrow circumstance of a plaintiff
who acted as a surrogate for the defendant in performance of what
the defendant would have done had he been present and which the
defendant confirms by his subsequent promise."' The fact-specific
moral obligation case of funeral expenses paid by a third person
provided a vehicle for an extension of Style v. Smith39 2 to other
emergency circumstances that qualified for moral obligation relief.
Both of the instigating seventeenth century funeral cases involved
burial of a child by a non-relative in the father's absence, and in
each instance, the father subsequently promised to repay expenses
borne by the plaintiff.3 93 Some emergency necessaries factual
categories, including payment of a dependent's funeral expenses,
have evolved into restitution grounds, where a subsequent promise is rendered superfluous."'
Beyond emergency necessaries, a strain of moral obligation decisions enforced promises for non-emergency necessaries provided
by the plaintiff to the promisor's loved ones; the earliest English
cases involved promises to pay for maintenance of the promisors'
bastard children.395 Most of the American cases involved promises
for necessaries provided to children 96 and for benefits provided to
aged parents.397 At the outer edge of moral obligation theory in a
of defendant's servant, while the benefit in Style was an emergency necessary administered
to defendant's son.
390. See NICHOLAS, supra note 260, at 227-29.
391. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 112 cmt. b (1937) (stating that

sometimes "it is desirable to encourage persons to interfere with the affairs of others" as
where it imperative to protect a person).
392. 74 Eng. Rep. 401 (1587).
393. Besfich v. Coggill, 81 Eng. Rep. 1219, 1220 (1628); Church v. Church, 73 Eng. Rep.
608 n.b. (1656).
394. See Jenkins v. Tucker, 126 Eng. Rep. 55, 57 (1788) (funeral of wife); France's Estate, 75 Pa. 220, 225 (1874) (funeral expenses); cf. Nicholson v. Chapman, 126 Eng. Rep.
536, 539 (1793) (dictum for case of emergency preservation of defendant's property); but cf.
Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Ore. 1887) (ruling restitution denied for property preservation in owner's absence).
395. See Anonymous., 89 Eng. Rep. 879 (1682); Scott v. Nelson (1763) reported in 127
Eng. Rep. 137, 138 n.a (1802).
396. See, e.g., Coleman v. Frum, 4 Ill. 378, 380 (1842); Hargroves v. Freeman, 12 Ga.
342, 350 (1852); Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181, 191 (1884).
397. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Badgett, 19 S.C. 591, 595 (1883); In re Estate of Flagg, 59
N.Y.S. 167, 169 (1899); Worth v. Daniel, 57 S.E. 898, 900 (Ga. App. 1907).
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realm admittedly more civilian,398 some jurisdictions have held
promises binding for non-necessaries provided to the promisor's
children39 9 and even to charities. The extraordinary moral obligation relief granted in a few of these non-necessaries cases may be
explainable on account of an admixture of moral obligation and
reliance elements present in the facts.4"' Charitable subscriptions
were binding in morals and conscience in the sixteenth century in
the absence of reliance, though no direct benefit flowed to the
promisor other than a spiritual one.4"' As late as the nineteenth
century, a few courts enforced a charitable subscription because of
a moral obligation alone, 4 2 and those twentieth century decisions
that enforced charitable subscriptions for policy reasons4 3 were
effectively based on moral obligation as well. Before the midnineteenth century, charitable subscriptions were increasingly
found binding when reliance was present.0 4
Finally, the other moral obligation sub-principle that falls beyond Section 86 pertains to promises made to atone for harm
caused by a promisor. Although the conventional view is that the
moral obligation principle covers promises to pay for past benefits
received, courts have ruled binding moral obligation promises
made to atone for past harms caused in relationships where cooperation and good faith were reasonably expected. 45 Recovery on
398. See DAWSON, GiFTS, supra note 2, at 96-100 (commenting that civilian jurisdictions
enforce consensual, gratuitous promises on moral obligations not binding at common law).
399. See, e.g., Marsh v. Rainsford, 74 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (1588) (enforcing father's promise to give marriage gift of 100 pounds to daughter and son-in-law subsequent to discovery
of their elopement); Lee v. Muggeridge, 128 Eng. Rep. 599, 603 (1813) (widow's ratification
of promise for benefit of son-in-law after coverture lifted); Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa.
367, 371 (1855) (divorcee's ratification of promise for benefit of son after coverture lifted).
400. See, e.g., Best & Jolly, 82 Eng. Rep. 955, 956 (1660) (Father's promise to pay son's
debt binding since father induced creditor's forbearance from proceeding against son.).
401. See DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 3, at 229-30; SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 431.
402. See, e.g., Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416 (1846) (opining that "Itihere is a moral obligation
for all the subscribers to fulfill their engagements").
403. See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (2) (1981) (proclaiming charitable subscriptions binding "without proof that the promise induced action"); Id. at cmt. f (indicating
"a probability of reliance is enough").
404. See, e.g., Trustees of Farmington Academy v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172 (1817); Robertson
v. March, 4 Ill. 198, 199 (1841); Pryor v. Cain, 25 111. 292 (1861).
405. A felt moral obligation to atone for harm caused has occasionally been masked by a
court stretching to emphasize some form of benefit in the facts in order to comply with the
conventional moral obligation benefit principle. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 197
(Ala. App. 1935) (emphasizing that McGowin benefitted from rescue); cert denied Webb v.
McGowin, 168 So. 199 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1936) (emphasizing injury to rescuer as well as benefit
to rescued promisor). The harm has also been sometimes masked by in cases of promises to
alleviate harm done by the parties' past cohabitation by reaching for a bargain in the fa-
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promises to indemnify or atone for wrongs or harm caused by
promisors have been rendered in contractual and reliance-based
contexts. A moral obligation promise to compensate for a nontortious wrong falls short of what is necessary to bring an action
in either restitution or tort; thus a binding subsequent promise
effectuates a just outcome in the same way that a promise falling
under Section 86 ameliorates inequity in facts short of the requirements of restitution.
Moral obligation promises in contractual contexts have been
held binding for harm caused during the phases of the life of a
contract; contract formation, performance and enforcement.
Promises have been held binding to atone for harm caused by contracts formed on account of egregious inducements, including
promisors' dishonesty, bad faith and fraud. 4 6 Harm caused during
the performance phase of contracts could not include mere unequal contract exchange values alone, but subsequent modification
promises have been ruled binding when unequal exchange values
were caused by significant and unanticipated changes in circumstances. °7 Modifications of contract relations have also been enforced when the reason for the subsequent promise was atonement
for fiduciary breaches of duties committed during contract performance. °8 A frequently litigated area in this regard has been
ther's annuity promise in exchange for the mother caring for her child. See Jennings v.
Brown, 152 Eng. Rep. 210, 212 (1842); Hicks v. Gregory, 137 Eng. Rep. 556, 557 (1849).
406. See, e.g., Trueman v. Fenton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232, 1234 (1777) (Mansfield, C.J. chagrined at dishonesty of inducing credit on eve of bankruptcy); Hurst v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n. 26 Al 956, 959 (Md. 1893) (discussing misrepresentations of financial
condition to induce loan); Haynes Chemical Corp. v. Staples & Staples, Inc., 112 S.E. 802,
804 (Va. 1922) (emphasizing lack of good faith when considering contract formation).
Promises to atone for harm caused to a woman by inducements to sexual relations and past
cohabitation have been found to be binding moral obligations in some nineteenth century
jurisdictions. See Wyant v. Lesher, 23 Pa. 338, 341 (1854) (declaring "it would be a disgrace
to our age and generation if the law" did not enforce promises on past and future cohabitation); Karoley v. Reid, 269 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Ark. 1954) (finding consideration in agreement
to permanently sever illicit relations).
407. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 257 U.S. 523, 526 (1922) (ruling government promise to pay more to contractor supported by binding "moral consideration" due to changes
caused by San Franciso earthquake); Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y. 198, 210 (1864)
(concluding unforeseen circumstances justified adjustment); King v. Duluth Ry. Co., 63
N.W. 1105, 1107 (1895) (saying unanticipated circumstances justified enforcement of modification); cf. Pittsburg Vitrified Paving and Bldg. Brick Co. v. Cerebus Oil Co., 100 P. 631,
633 (Kans. 1909) (enforcing subsequent promise because of unjust enrichment realized by
promisor during performance).
408. See, e.g., Gray v. Hamil, 10 S.E. 205 (Ga. 1889) (holding promisor bound because of
failure to perform partnership duties on account of excessive use of stimulants); Cardwell's
Administrators v. Strother, 16 Ky. 429, 432 (1821) (ruling moral obligation supported promise to cure deficiency in deed of conveyance); Spear v. Griffith, 86 111. 552 (1877) (finding
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adjustments to employment benefits because of insufficient remuneration after long and faithful service. Civilian jurisdictions
have been more inclined to enforce such wage adjustments, 4°9 but
common law courts have given relief in cases of extreme underpayment"' and when harm was caused by reliance on employers'
misrepresentations or past practices.4 '
Harm caused during the contract enforcement phase concerns
promises to modify the impact of unfair court judgments. When
an offending judgment is out-of-line or simply wrong, the felt pang
of moral obligation may generate a promise to modify or waive the
impact of the judgment upon the wronged party. Court decisions
have justified enforcement of these promises for the reason that
the promisor was bound once he did what he ought to do by recognizing his or her moral duty to abate any harm caused by the
judgment.412 In the case of a plaintiff who received too little under
a judgment, the promise to increase what was owed has been justified because, though the judgment extinguished plaintiffs claim,
"[tihe moral obligation to pay these items was not extinguished.""3
Some decisions justified enforcement by analogies to traditional
precedents for waivers of a statute of limitations or of bank41 5
ruptcy. 4 4 However, unlike the facts in the waiver precedents,
the judgment itself caused the harm, and the moral obligation
raised by that harm is the moral consideration that supports enforcement of the subsequent promise. Unwritten promises to
moral obligation to promise compensation for mistake in conveyance). Promises to make
amends for poor performance of fiduciary duties has proved a fertile area for recovery. See
Scott v. Carruth, 17 Tenn. 418, 420 (1836); Hyman v. Succession of Parkerson, 72 So. 953,
955 (La. 1916); Slayton v. Slayton, 315 So. 588, 590 (Ala. 1975).
409. See, e.g., Barthe v. Succession of J. LaCroix, 29 La. Ann. 326, 327 (1877) (stating
that adjustment of wages for past services was a "natural obligation" and not a mere gratuity).
410. See, e.g., In re Schoenkerman's Estate, 294 N.W. 810, 811-12 (1940) (enforcing
bonus promise to in-laws who cared for promisor's young children for ten years for room
and board alone); Earl v. Peck, 64 N.Y. 596, 599 (1876); Worth v. Case, 42 N.Y. 362 (1870);
contra Loan Assoc. v. Stonemetz, 29 Pa. 534 (1858); Plowman v. Indian Refinery Co., 20 F.
1937).
Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill.
411. See, e.g., Grady v. Appalacian Electric Power Co., 29 S.E.2d 878, 883 (W. Va. 1944)
(enforcing promise of disability benefit because of both misrepresentation by company representative and employee's reliance on company's custom of paying disability benefits);
Bailey v. Philadelphia, 31 A. 925, 926 (Pa. 1895) (concluding that moral obligation raised in
light of plaintiff-school principal's reliance on school board election).
412. See Turlington v. Slaughter, 54 Ala. 195, 197 (1875).
413. Brunhoeber v. Brunhoeber, 304 P.2d 521, 523 (Kans. 1956).
414. See Stebbins v. The County of Crawford, 92 Pa. 289, 295 (1879); Brunhoeber, 303
P.2d at 523.
415. English courts have refused to extend traditional waiver precedents. See TRIETEL,
supra note 260, at 76.
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waive the impact of judgments have been less successful than
formal waivers due to the higher footing a judgment enjoys over a
contract debt.416
The remaining category of promises to compensate for harm
caused relates to promises made to compensate for previous reliance hardship induced. These tend to entail fact situations in
which, though defendant induced some form of reliance, the elements of promissory estoppel have not been fulfilled. Still, the
promisor felt moved to promise recompense because of a sense of
moral obligation caused by the reliance hardship suffered. The
subsequent promise cures the inability to use promissory estoppel
in much the same way that a restitutionary promise covered by
Section 86 overcomes the unavailability of the doctrine of restitution. Courts have used two approaches in finding these promises
binding. The straightforward judicial explanation has been to
state that the moral obligation raised by the induced reliance loss
binds the subsequent promise; the alternative approach has been
for courts to find a binding contract through manipulation of the
doctrine of consideration.
The straightforward use of the moral obligation principle to
atone for induced reliance can be seen in the 1922 Virginia decision Haynes Chemical Corporation v. Staples & Staples, Inc."7
This decision is the basis for illustration number eight to Restatement Second Section 86,418 notwithstanding the point that the case
facts are devoid of any benefit flowing to the promisor. The plaintiff was induced to spend a large amount of time and effort to prepare a business proposal, which the defendant promised would be
given its "heartiest consideration," but in the end the plaintiffs
plan was given no attention whatsoever. The company's general
manager acknowledged how shabbily the plaintiff had been
treated and promised to pay his expenses. 9 The defendant company objected to the use of the moral obligation principle to bind
the defendant to that promise, but the court concluded that the
moral obligation principle made the promise binding once reliance
Other decisions have come to the forthright conwas induced.'
clusion that a promise to pay for induced reliance loss is binding

416. See Anspach v. Brown, 7 Watts. 139, 140 (Pa. 1838); Stebbins, 92 Pa. at 295.
417. 112 S.E. 802 (Va. 1922).
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 illus. 8 (1981).
419. Haynes, 112 S.E. at 804.
420. Id.
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under the moral obligation principle, 421 ' but the more common solution has been for courts to rationalize recovery through manipulation of the doctrine of consideration, thereby avoiding flying in the
face of the conventional moral obligation principle stated in Section 86. By manipulation of consideration, courts have concluded
that the induced reliance constituted consideration for the subsequent promise or that the moral obligation generated by inducing
reliance was sufficient consideration. 41' For example, an employee
relied upon his employer's custom of providing disability benefits
by remaining in the defendant's employ.4 23 The court said no legal
obligation was created by the custom because of its indefiniteness,
but that the reliance on the custom supported the company's
The court armoral obligation promise of a disability benefit 4.
rived at this conclusion despite the fact that the reliance of staying
on the job had not been bargained-for since the custom was not
shown to have been an inducement at hiring nor was there any
indication that a bargain had been struck for disability protection
in exchange for continued employment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The scattered reliance and moral obligation precedents rendered
prior to the eighteenth century were discussed and advanced in a
more orderly fashion under the influence of Enlightenment ideas
during the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of
the nineteenth centuries in both the United States and England.
Inspiration at common law was found in English Chief Justice
Holt's narrowly crafted reliance and moral obligation relief, and
Chief Justice Mansfield's equitable and natural law ideas proved
particularly attractive to American jurisdictions during those
heady early republican days. Both justifiable reliance and moral
obligation reflected judicial unease over a monist bargain test
which could cause injustices if these gratuitous promises were not
421. See, e.g., Hurst v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 26 A. 956, 957-58 (Md. 1893)
(stating that promisor had placed himself under a moral obligation since his representations had induced plaintiff to rely).
422. Alternatively some decisions have found a bargained exchange elsewhere in the
facts. See e.g., Jennings v. Brown, 152 Eng. Rep. 210, 212 (1842) (concluding that bargain
made for mother to care for child of parties' former cohabitation in exchange for annuity).
423. See Grady v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 29 S.E.2d 878 (W.Va. 1944).
424. Id. at 881-82 (indicating agent said company would pay employee $70 per month for
life); cf. Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 367, 371 (1855) (stating that a "moral duty" generated by induced reliance was not enforceable by law but was "a sufficient consideration for
an express promise to perform that duty").

Fall 2004

Binding Gratuitous Promises

enforced. However, a backlash against imported continental ideas
arose among conservative common law thinkers during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century as formalist support for the
The
market bargain marginalized ameliorating exceptions.
dampening effect on moral obligation relief may have been greater
than that on reliance actions in that the latter was under the radar of jurists of the time, with the exception of a few vocal judicial
opponents like Kent. The principal goal of the conservative judges
was the annihilation of Mansfield's broad moral obligation pronouncements which threatened the centrality of the doctrine of
consideration. The long term success of this reactionary campaign
was much greater in the unitary legal system of England and
Wales than it was in the multiplicity of American jurisdictions,
where regional experimentation with natural law ideas was possible in parts of the country.
Growth in justifiable reliance and moral obligation began anew
during the second half of the nineteenth century as rapid changes
in the American economy and in industrial society necessitated
contractors' capacity to react and adjust to unanticipated change.
In commercial contexts, that flux stimulated the need to devise
transactions in more open-ended forms, and in the case of felt
moral obligations, restitutionary promises were extended upon the
discovery of a promisor's receipt of unexpected enrichment. These
hardship solutions were rationalized on equitable and legal
grounds by newly fused courts. Justifications for relief were sometimes drawn from natural law and from the equitable devices
causa, moral consideration and equitable estoppel; more often,
however, common law courts operated within the confines of the
bargain construct by either disingenuous manipulation of facts
and doctrine to declare a bargain present or more often by the
finding of sufficient consideration to bind a voluntary promise in
the alternatives to bargain of justifiable reliance and moral obligation. Indeed, voluntary consent is a fundamental underpinning of
both justifiable reliance and moral obligation; a voluntary promise
raises reasonable expectations in the case of reliance, and a moral
obligation promise negates the fear of officiousness and defines
the scope of liability.
During the generation subsequent to the publication of the first
Restatement, opposition returned, but by the 1960s the pendulum
swung back again the other way. Williston's commentary to the
first Restatement marginalized promissory estoppel to a scope not
much beyond charitable subscriptions, and he urged bargain as
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the sole test of a binding commercial promise. Furthermore, the
Restatement denied the validity of moral obligation relief beyond
the old waiver and ratification precedents of the early eighteenth
century. The Restatement's drafters sought predictable rules for
market operators and so denied the equitable tendencies of the
previous decades; the reaction that followed in the case law during
the subsequent generation constituted yet another formalist reaction against equitable and natural law ideas supportive of justifiable reliance and the moral obligation principle. The drafters of
the restatement rejected what they perceived to be excessive injection of equity and natural law into common law contract during
the previous century, but in introducing their monist bargain consideration test, they had to ignore four centuries of legal history
regarding development of these alternative reasons sufficient to
satisfy the doctrine of consideration. The legislative mind of a
drafter is naturally desirous of distilling various reasons found in
case law into a predictable first principle for modern planners, but
legislative enactments like restatements fail in their structural
incapacity to take into account the variety of good reasons common courts have found in human behavior for the enforcement of
promises.
In summarizing the development of the justifiable reliance alternative to bargain consideration, the ground appeared in common law contract in the early sixteenth century as an aspect of
what became the consideration test for the emerging action of assumpsit at a time when assumpsit was still perceived as a reliance
remedy. But by the middle of the sixteenth century this nascent
notion of consideration was converted into a test that required
reciprocity. Over a century later, Holt, C.J. exhumed the early use
of reliance as consideration to bind a gratuitous bailee who negligently carried out his promise to safely convey goods, and later in
the eighteenth century, Mansfield's court justified reliance relief
on the basis of natural law. In early nineteenth century America,
Kent attempted to narrow Holt's decision to cases of tortious misfeasance, but not long after the middle of the nineteenth century,
support grew for the equitable notion that a reliance hardship
ground ought to be considered an alternative basis, to bargain, for
promissory enforcement. Then during the second half of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of justifiable reliance grew into a relatively common equitable exception for two categories of promises:
charitable subscriptions and commercial promises.
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Charitable subscription decisions operated within a sui generis,
policy-charged field. Charitable and business precedents became
interchangeable, and charitable subscription decisions acted as
precedents for family gift promises, but subscription decisions did
not act as precedent for reliance on promises in a commercial context. In rationalizing enforcement of subscription promises in the
absence of bargains, common law courts borrowed the equitable
techniques of equitable estoppel and causa for consideration.
Powerful instrumental policy reasons underlined the enforcement
of business and community subscriptions, made for subscribers'
mutual benefit, to build the infrastructure of communities emerging in the westward expansion of the nation in the absence of government assistance.
A contextual reason for the upsurge in commercial justifiable reliance decisions in the nineteenth century flowed from contractors'
experimentation with flexibly designed commercial promises to
contend with the unpredictability of industrial age market swings.
Contractors' use of promissory innovations to adapt their now
longer term relations to uncertainties in the form of open-ended
contract language, unilateral offers, at-will relations and the
greater likelihood of the need to modify contract relations. In
cases of contractors' reliance on these consensual attempts to contend with uncertainty, attempts to enforce these innovative contractual practices butted up against traditional contract requirements of definiteness, mutuality, reciprocity of bargain and its
attendant preexisting duty rule. In spite of these doctrinal barriers to enforcement of new forms of agreements, courts did begin to
grant equitable relief when reliance upon these novel arrangements caused hardship. By at least the 1860s, such reliance hardship prompted courts to provide relief through extensions of theories at law and equity.
Reliance recovery was justified under a variety of judicial rationales until the first Restatement unified certain of the grounds
into the so-called doctrine of promissory estoppel. Prior to the Restatement, some jurisdictions justified relief under extensions of
Holt's use of assumpsit's reliance origins in tort. Justifications
were also drawn from the equitable part performance exception to
the statute of frauds and from the notion that induced reliance
hardship constituted causa for enforcement. Elsewhere support for
reliance was found in a coalescence of good faith reliance in equity
and consensual theory support for parties' freely designed method
of dealing with the unforeseen future. There were also doctrinally
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flawed rationales based on the inappropriate use of equitable estoppel and disingenuous manipulation of bargain consideration.
The equitable solutions crafted by judges of law and equity required the balancing of doctrinal demands for certain contract
provisions with consensual theory support for adaptations of relations to contend with the unfolding of promissory transactions.
This perplexing variety of justifications notwithstanding, reliance
on contracts designed to adjust to industrial age change contributed significantly to the growth in the doctrine of justifiable reliance. It would only be with Restatement Section 90 that an organizing principle would be provided for the doctrine now called
promissory estoppel.
In summarizing the development of the moral obligation principle exception to bargain consideration, moral obligation decisions
likewise first appeared in sixteenth century English common law
decisions. The early decisions of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries involved promises to pay for necessaries supplied to dependents of the promisor. At the turn of the eighteenth century,
Holt, C.J. rendered his widely adopted exceptions to the bargain
principle for statute of limitations waivers and adult ratifications.
Later in that century, Mansfield employed a civilian approach to
generalize a broader principle as a means of accommodating a
wider range of moral obligations. Mansfield's enlightened ideas
were pursued during next half century in England and republican
America. Mansfield's language may have been overly broad, but
the actual facts of the cases he decided did not go beyond the case
law in many American jurisdictions today. Nevertheless, during
the second quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States
and England, a conservative common law reaction set in against
those of Mansfield's enlightened natural law ideas that roamed
beyond Holt's exceptions to the bargain standard. This opposition
permanently arrested development in England, but it had only a
temporary effect in some American jurisdictions and little or no
effect in jurisdictions more committed to republican natural law
ideals.
In those states which continued to recognize a broader moral obligation throughout the nineteenth century, a variety of justifications were given for enforcement of moral obligation promises.
Close extensions of Holt's waiver and ratification exceptions were
widely accepted as binding and supported by consideration. In the
wake of conservative opposition to the moral obligation principle,
some state courts disingenuously manipulated consideration doc-
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trine by implication of fictional previous request in order to bring
the case under the bargain principle. A natural law justification
was given by Kent in judicial dictum in support of a promise to
provide restitution since the promise obviated concern over officiousness. A few fused courts of law and equity declared that the
promise of restitution was supported by equitable moral consideration. And in a few jurisdictions, a moral obligation was said to
provide consideration to support a promise to pay for a benefit
previously received by the promisor. This last rationale that
moral obligation could act as an alternative basis for consideration
was the widely recognized reasoning used for the American moral
obligation principle by at least the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Nevertheless, Williston did not recognize a moral obligation principle in the first Restatement except for Holt's precedents.
It would only be with the Second Restatement that an organizing
principle would be articulated for some of the moral obligation
developments beyond the waiver and ratification precedents. The
conventional American moral obligation principle recognized today was finally enunciated in the Restatement Second of Contracts
Section 86, which stated the version of the promisor's moral obligation liability that had been accepted by courts in New York and
some other states for over a century.
In closing, throughout the nearly five hundred year history of
the common law of contract, there have been three reasons courts
have recognized for enforcement of promises voluntarily made.
Bargain has been the predominant reason, but it has never been
the exclusive reason for binding' promisors because of the occasional hardship caused by a strict demand for reciprocity. Naturally not all promises uttered are binding in law, but in the course
of promissory transactions on the periphery of the market bargain,
two categories of gratuitous promises have been found worthy of
enforcement by the community as a means of averting injustice. A
legal system of promissory liability would be a harsh and unjust
system if it were to only enforce market bargains to the exclusion
of occasional hardships suffered when a promise induces reasonable reliance or when a felt moral obligation engenders a promise
to make restitution. These two types of gratuitous promises are
consensual, they are made in a context that indicates a good reason for the promise, and they raise reasonable expectations that,
in fairness, the promisors would not later deny liability because of
lack of bargain.
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Since the advent of treatise writers in the early nineteenth century, there have been ebbs and flows in the availability of relief for
reliance and moral obligation because of the influence enjoyed by
these overseers of doctrinal purity and consistency. The formalist
instinct of commentators, conservative judges and, eventually,
restatement drafters, has been to corral predictable first principles, like bargain, from the morass of case law and to marginalize
or reject the messiness of equitable exceptions. Resultant judicial
reactions against the liberalizing impact of these equitable exceptions have meant temporary setbacks for enforcement of gratuitous promises, and it has been suggested that we may be in such a
conservative reactionary period again today. The periodic formalist-inspired suggestions that upsurges in promissory estoppel and
moral obligation relief are aberrant deviants from the monist bargain norm are inaccurate claims in law and are founded upon bad
legal history. Reliance, moral obligation and bargain have coexisted within a tripartite system of promissory liability since the
sixteenth century origins of the action of assumpsit and its attendant test the doctrine of consideration. Unavoidably, this coexistence has been uneasy due to the dissonance caused by these equitable alternatives to the predictability of the predominant bargain
standard, but dogmatic consistency, irrespective of hardship facts,
does not a fair system of justice make. So while there might be
today a temporary ebbing away from the liberal justice granted a
generation ago under promissory estoppel and the moral obligation principle, inevitably the two equitable alternatives to bargain
will flourish again. In the end, the fair administration of contract
law must include hardship relief for injustices that can sometimes
be caused by the absolutism of the bargain principle.

